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THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION: THE INFLUENCE OF
LEGAL TRADITION ON FRENCH AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Dana Zartner Falstrom·

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the months leading up to the U.S. intervention in Iraq in March 2003, the
dialogue between the United States and France on the appropriate course of action to
take in response to Iraq's report on its weapons of mass destruction revealed
differences between these traditional allies as to the options available under
international law. These differences did not center on the goals of any proposed
action-both sides in fact agreed upon the goals, 1 which were to ensure there were no
weapons of mass destruction; to prevent an increase in terrorist activity; and to address
the continuing violations of international law perpetuated by Saddam Hussein. 2 What
was in dispute, however, was the timing and form of action available under
international law.3 In particular, France and the United States were unable to come to

• Adjunct Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Martin Rogoff, Ilse Teeters-Trurnpy, and the entire staff at the Maine Law Review for their comments
and assistance. She would also like to extend heartfelt thanks to Miroslav Nincic, Larry Peterman and
especially Carl Falstrom for their encouragement and support.
I. This has been the case most often post-WWII. France and the United States typically agree upon
the goal, but disagree about the means of attaining that goal. See ROBERTKAGAN,OF PARADISE
AND POWER
29 (2004).
2. Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry ofForeign Affairs (Feb. 16, 2003), available
at http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France/mfa/france-mfa-chirac-021603.htm. Mr. Chirac stated:
Nor do we have any differences over the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction. For that matter, if Saddam Hussein would only vanish, it would without
a doubt be the biggest favour he could do for his people and for the world. But we think this
goal can be reached without starting a war.
Id.
3. France's position, highlighted by President Chirac on March IO, 2003:
We have said: ''we want to disarm Iraq." ... We unanimously chose the path of disarming
him. Today, nothing tells us that this path is a dead end and, consequently, it must be
pursued since war is always a final resort, always an acknowledgement of failure, always the
worst solution, because it brings death and misery. And we don't consider we are at that
point. That's why we are refusing to embark on a path automatically leading to war so long
as the inspectors haven't told us: ''we can't do any more." And they are telling us the
opposite.
Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. I 0, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqwatch.org/govemment/France/mfa/france-mfa/chirac/03 l 003.htm. Contrast this with the
following statement by President Bush on December 2, 2003:
Americans seek peace in this world. We're a peaceful nation. War is the last option for
confronting threats. Yet the temporary peace of denial and looking away from danger would
only be a prelude to broader war and greater horror. America will confront gathering dangers
early, before our options become limited and desperate. By showing our resolve today, we
are building a future of peace. In the decisions and missions to come, our military will carry
the values of America and the hopes of the world. The people of Iraq, like all human beings,
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agreement on whether a valid interpretation of the international laws of war would
allow for the United States' proposed anticipatory intervention, or whether pre-existing
notions limiting military intervention to imminent threats were binding on any
proposed action, no matter how noble the goal. 4
The United States and France ultimately did not see eye to eye on the appropriate
course of action and in the end, the United States entered Iraq without the support of
the French. Many saw this as a manifestation of a growing divide between the two
countries. The reasons given for this rift have been plentiful-the French resent U.S.
power; the United States resents France's efforts to balance the United States with a
stronger European Union; the two countries disagree on trade relations; there is a
general growing anti-American sentiment among the French population. But do these
accounts truly provide an explanation for the disagreement between the two counties?
In fact, is it true that there is even a significant division between France and the United
States in terms of the laws of war? Or for that matter, is there, as many of the abovementioned theories would indicate, is there an underlying division between the two
states when it comes to international law and the international system generally?
Many might argue the evidence is overwhelmingly so. But do these explanations truly
provide an accurate depiction of French and American behavior?
To address these questions, this essay will examine the approaches of France and
the United States towards international law. In doing so, I suggest that although in the
past several decades France and the United States have frequently approached
international law from different perspectives, neither view results in a greater notion
of justice nor an absolutely better record of compliance with international law. At the
same time, however, I consider why these two countries, although similar in many
ways (both countries are advanced, industrialized democracies founded on the liberal
principles of the Enlightenment), and although both having past records of adhering
to international law, have a historical tension in their approaches to international law.
That tension is evident in both countries' willingness to recognize and adhere to
international law, and their willingness to change it.

desetve their freedom. And the people of Afghanistan-with the help of the United States
Armed Forces-have gained their freedom.
Press Release, The White House, President Signs National Defense Authorization Act (Dec. 2, 2002),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-8.html.
4. The norms of just war have long been recognized to include, in addition to the right of self-defense
if attacked, the right to engage in military operations if a state is under imminent attack. While there has
been debate over the meaning of the term 'imminent,' it has been held that the definition put forth by U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case provides fundamental guidelines: "exceptions
growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which
the 'necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
LAW412 ( 1906). In the recent
for deliberation."' 2 JOHNBASSETTMOORE,A DIGESTOFINTERNATIONAL
debate over Iraq, the argument made by the U.S. further pushed this conception of anticipatory strike. The
U.S. position was that, in a world of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction the possibility of attack
takes on a new meaning, and this new meaning calls for new interpretations of international law. France,
on the other hand, preferred to maintain the existing definition of imminent attack, considering the evidence
available as to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to be insufficient. For further discussion of the Caroline
Doctrine, see Martin Rogoff & Edward Collins, The Caroline Incident And The Development Of
International Law 16 BROOK.J. lNT'L L. 493, 498 (I 990).
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I contend that understanding this tension is key, not only for understanding the
recent disagreement between the two states, but for explaining the different approaches
the two states have taken to international law. Further, I theorize that this tension can
be illuminated by an examination of the legal traditions that have shaped the behavior
of the two countries. Specifically, I suggest that the different legal traditions of
France and the United States contribute to the different outcomes we have seen in
terms of the two countries and their treatment ofinternational law. The legal tradition
of a state, developed from the state's history with law and conception of the role oflaw
in society, coupled with the legal and political institutions that have developed out of
this history, help to determine the position a state affords international law as a guiding
force in determining state behavior. France and the United States certainly maintain
many similarities, and remain close allies in many situations. However, different legal
histories and perceptions of the role of law have led to different beliefs today that
shape the idea of international law as a guiding factor affecting state behavior. Beliefs
that are shaped by legal tradition include conceptions of state sovereignty and the
willingness of a state to give up absolute sovereignty for a cooperative purpose;
acceptance of foreign relationships and entanglement; and whether change is better
made through multilateral, diplomatic discourse, or through more direct action adopted
to fit new and changing circumstances. France and the United States sometimes have
different positions on these beliefs, positions developed through history and reinforced
through the creation of institutions and the evolution of perceptions of law. It is these
differences which cause the United States and France to view international law through
different lenses, and which can thus result in conflict between the two on how
international law should be treated in any given situation.
The French legal tradition, founded on a mixture of Roman law, Canon law, and
local custom, and heavily influenced by the French Revolution and France's position
in Europe, has developed into one in which law plays a central role in the life of all
French people. 5 The centrality oflaw and the conception that law exists to benefit the
community facilitates the incorporation of international legal principles into the
domestic legal framework. 6 The influence of the French tradition on the political and

5. The continental conception of law, which prevails in France, is very different [from the
common law]. Although law is certainly the concern of jurists, it is not their concern alone.
It involves the whole population, because it establishes the very principles of social order and
thus tells citizens how they should behave, in accordance with the community's ideas of
what is moral and just. Law should not be, and is not, an esoteric science; rather, it must be
accessible to the greatest possible number of persons. Because it has an educational role, it
is linked to the whole prevailing existential philosophy. It takes the place of social morality
and, for some, aspires to replace religion itself.
RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAw: ITS STRUCTURE,
SOURCES,AND METHODOLOGY
73 (Michael Kindred trans.,
Louisiana State U. Press 1972) (1960).
6. International law is, of course, created at the international system level through multilateral
discussion, treaties, and the work of international organizations. Compliance with international law,
however, must take place through incorporation of international legal principles into the domestic legal
structure of a state. For a state to truly comply with its international legal obligations it must believe such
rules are binding. In countries like France and the United States (i.e. representative democracies) it is the
voting population that influences government decisions about state behavior. The better international law
is incorporated into the domestic framework, the more likely the populations of these states are to
acknowledge and accept its tenets, and the more likely it is that the population will want the government to
act according to those tenets that it feels are binding. Once incorporated, principles of international law are
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 340 2006
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legal institutions of the state, on the sources oflaw and methods of interpretation used,
and on the public perception of the role of law and the position of France towards
international law shapes the behavior of France when acting within the international
system.
The legal tradition of the United States, on the other hand, originating in the
common law tradition of England, but influenced by the principles of the American
Revolution and by the unique circumstances of the growth and development of the
United States as a country, uses the law primarily as a mechanism to protect individual
interests. 7 This focus inward and concentration on individual rights founded in U.S.
legal history has made more varied the recognition of the settled interpretations and
binding force of international law by the United States. Moreover, in addition to the
general attitude about law, the structure of the political and legal institutions in the
United States makes incorporation ofinternational law into the domestic legal system
more difficult. Thus, although it is generally a state that adheres to international law
and supports the international legal system, the United States has historically been
more likely than France to push the outer boundaries of accepted concepts of international law.
In this essay, I will discuss the role of the French and American legal traditions
in explaining each state's behavior in terms ofrecognition and adherence to existing
international law. Although not suggesting this is an all-encompassing explanation for
the behavior of these two states, I propose consideration of legal traditions as a key
contributing factor; a hypothesis supported by historical analysis. For purposes of this
essay, I will use as my primary example the international laws regarding anticipatory
intervention that was the central point of debate leading up to the Iraq intervention in
2003. However, I suggest that this same theory would explain the behavior between
these two countries in terms of public international law generally.
The first section of this essay will define legal tradition and explain the importance
of legal tradition as an explanatory variable for state behavior. In examining the
influence of legal tradition, I focus on four specific components: the historical
development of the tradition; the legal institutions developing out of the tradition; the
sources of law and their interpretation that form part of the tradition; and the public
perceptions of the role oflaw stemming from the legal tradition. I will next tum to a
discussion of the legal traditions of France and the United States, focusing my
discussion on the historical development of law in each country and how this
development has influenced the modem-day role oflaw in each of the states. In doing
so, I will concentrate on the values underlying the historical development of law and
how this has influenced the legal institutions which have developed, the sources and
interpretation oflaw, and the role oflaw in society as perceived by the population of
each country. Third, I will discuss the role that legal tradition plays in influencing a
state's behavior in the international system, particularly in regards to the treatment of

viewed in the same manner as domestic laws, both in terms of binding authority and in terms of
interpretation and alteration.
7. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON,ET AL., MICHAELWALLACEGoRDON,& CHRISTOPHER
OSAKWE,COMPARATIVE
LEGALTRADITIONS
(2d ed. 1994); LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN,A HISTORYOF
AMERICAN
LAW(2d ed. 1985); JEAN-BAPTISTE
DUROSELLE,
FRANCEANDTHEUNITEDSTATES:FROMTHE
BEGINNINGS
TOTHEPRESENT12 (Derek Coltman trans., 1978).
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international law. In doing so I will also examine some of the key alternative
explanations that have been put forth to explain the different views of France and the
United States. I suggest that rather than refuting these alternative explanations,
considering a state's legal tradition provides the constitutive framework through which
all other variables influence decision-making. Finally, I will conclude with a
discussion of the importance of understanding the subtle differences among legal
traditions in order to minimize the potential for misunderstanding, as was evident
between the two countries leading up to the 2003 Iraq intervention.

II.

THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRADmON

Although state behavior in the international system has long been the subject of
academic discussion, the role that law and legal institutions play in framing state
behavior has received scant coverage in the literature. 8 Perhaps paradoxically, when
considering a state's approach to international law, it is important to first examine its
domestic treatment of law, arising as it does out of a state's legal tradition. This is
because for international law to be binding on a state it must be incorporated from the
international system level into the domestic legal system. While power, interests, and
reputation 9 are all factors in a state's determination ofits appropriate course of action,
whether in the domestic or international arena, each of these factors is framed in terms
of the legal possibilities and the perceptions of the just course of action for the state.
It is therefore important to consider the influence of legal tradition on a state's
domestic behavior as a paramount factor in determining the approach a state takes in
determining how it will function within an international legal framework.
A. What is a Legal Tradition?

Legal tradition has been defined as a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature oflaw, the role oflaw in the society and the polity, and the
proper organization and operation of a legal system. 10 The legal tradition of a state
arises out of the historical and cultural roots that led to the formation of modem legal
institutions within the state, and thus affects the way law is used as well as the
perception of the population towards law and its role in society. This applies to both
national law as well as international law.

8. A few scholars have identified the need for the fields of international law and international relations
to consider legal explanations for state behavior. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLEY,THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed.
1963); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 205 (1993) [hereinafter Slaughter Burley, A Dual Agenda]; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 367 (1998) [hereinafter Slaughter, New Generation]; Beth Simmons,
Compliance with International Agreements, I ANN.REv. POL. SCI. 75 (1998) [hereinafter Simmons, Int'/
Agreements]; Beth Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL.SCI.REV.819 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons, Commitment &
Compliance]. However, none of these scholars have evaluated legal tradition from a historical perspective
in order to determine its role in framing state decisions regarding international law.
9. For a discussion of alternative theories on state behavior, see Part V.
I 0. William Tetley, Mu:ed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA.
L. REV.677, 682 (2000).
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The legal tradition that develops within a particular state is both a function of a
multitude of historical factors, and a framework that allows certain institutions and
beliefs to develop. In both France and the United States, revolution and principles of
the Enlightenment have had a great influence on the legal tradition. From these
notions-captured in the works of Locke, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Tocqueville, and
Rousseau-institutional arrangements have come into existence which further the
underlying values concerning the law prevalent in the two systems. 11 While France
and the United States share many core values, the differences in history surrounding
the development of these values and the situations in which the countries have found
themselves post-revolution have created differing conceptions of law between the
two. 12
B. A Theory on the Influence of Legal Tradition

This paper suggests that the legal traditions of France and the United States
illuminate the different perspectives of the two countries regarding international law.
A country's legal tradition shapes all aspects oflaw within that society. Legal tradition
influences the role oflaw in a society and the institutional structure of its legal system,
as well as its general political system and the public perception oflaw in terms of what
it is designed to achieve. These components combine to create the framework in
which a government makes decisions about the appropriate course of state action.
France, with its civil law tradition founded on a mixture of Roman law, Canon law,
and customary law, and combined with a history of authoritarian government and a
delayed realization of the French Revolution's democratic principles, has developed
a particular set of beliefs about the role of law and consequently the place of
international law. On the other hand, the United States, with its legal tradition arising
out of English common law but heavily influenced by the American Revolution, the
ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers, and the unique geographical position of the
United States in the world, has developed a different perspective. When these different
perspectives collide, as they did in the case of the United States intervention in Iraq in
2003, France and the United States are very likely to disagree on the international
legality of particular actions.
Accordingly, a state's legal tradition is the underlying force behind its treatment
of international law. A state's level of compliance with international law is a function
of the historical role oflaw, both domestic and international, within the state, as well
as the role the population of the state feels the law should play. Legal tradition can
create a binding sense of legal obligation and an identifiable course of appropriate
action, while at the same time shaping the state's interests, which remain an integral

11. See JOHNLocKE,TwO'fREATISESOFGoVERNMENT{Peter
Laslett ed., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690); CHARLESDE SECONDAT,
BARONDE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRITOF THE LAWS(Anne M.
Cobler et al. trans. eds. Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748); MICHELDE MONTAIGNE,
THE COMPLETE
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA
ESSAYS(M.A. Screech ed. Penguin Books 1991); ALEXISDE TOCQUEVILLE,
(Stephen D. Grant trans. Hackett Pub!' g Co., 2000) ( 1835); JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU,
Du CONTRA
T SOCIAL
(G.F. Flammarion 1992) (1762).
12. For a discussion of the different interpretations of constitutionalism between the two states, see
Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison o/Constitutionalism in France and The United States, 49 ME. L. REv. 21
(1997).
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part of any state decision-making process. More specifically, contemporary attitudes
towards the authority of existing international law can best be seen as a function of a
state's historical legal tradition and how this legal tradition shapes the legal culture and
institutional structures within each state. Beyond the reality that France is a civil law
state and the United States a common law state, 13the underlying historical and cultural
characteristics that form the foundations of these two legal traditions have created
differing perspectives in the two countries on the role oflaw in society, the acceptance
of international law as a form of law, and the freedom to push our understanding of
law beyond existing doctrine.
France and the United States share many similarities, stemming from the
revolutionary principles that form the basis of each country's identity. 14 However,
each country developed under unique historical circumstances and each produced, and
in tum were influenced by, distinctive legal and political institutions. While both
countries are adherents to the rule of law, France and the United States do have
different histories when it comes to the consideration of international law. These
differences come not only from recognition and acceptance of international legal
principles, 15 which are greatly influenced by each state's conception of the idea of
sovereignty, 16 but also from the treatment afforded by each state to those principles
they hold as binding. France and the United States maintain different approaches to
the incorporation of international law into the domestic law of the state, the authority
given to such law, and the means by which to change such law. It is these
differences-all stemming from the legal traditions of the state supported by unique
historical development-that account for variation between the two countries in their
treatment of international law.
Both the historical ties of the civil law tradition in France and the institutional
structures that have developed from this foundation facilitate the incorporation of
international law into French legal doctrine. Each has created a profound awareness
of international law in France. At the same time, the historical French connection to
written law and the French use of codes 17 has made it more difficult for France to adapt
quickly to changes in the international system that may require corresponding changes
in international law. As a legal culture that relies heavily on the mechanism of public
discussion, which should take place before changes in the law can occur within the
legislative body, the French legal tradition is not as able to facilitate rapid change in
the law through highlighting differences in present cases compared to the past, as the
United States attempted to do with Iraq in 2003. France is and has long been a
diplomatic nation at its core, preferring to discuss and negotiate resolutions to crises

13. On France, see JOHNP. DAWSON,THEORACLES
OF LAW263 (1968) ("In modem times throughout
most of the world France is regarded as the very model of a 'civil law' country.").
14. See Rogoff, supra note 12, at 30 ("[T]he French and American Revolutions, guided by the principles
of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and the inalienable rights of man, together mark the transition from
the old world to the new.").
15. France has more readily incorporated modem international rules into its domestic legal system. For
example, of twenty major multilateral treaties sponsored by the United Nations since I 945, France has
ratified seventeen, compared to only six for the United States. See United Nations Treaty Database,
available at http://untreaty.un.org (subscription required).
16. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 58.
17. See DAVID,supra note 5, at 11-16.
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rather than act boldly. 18 This preference is evident throughout France's history 19 and
was certainly the case in the months leading up to the 2003 Iraq crisis.
On the other hand, the history and institutional characteristics of the legal tradition
of the United States have led to the establishment of a legal culture much less
influenced by or accepting of outside legal influences such as international law.20 The
incorporation of international legal norms into the domestic legal culture is
correspondingly more difficult in the United States than it is in France. As a country
based on the rule oflaw, however, the United States does take part in the international
legal order, and like France complies with international rules more often than not.
Where the two countries differ, however, are those instances where the United States
has been willing to push the boundaries of existing international law to meet new and
changing needs in the international system. This was the case with the U.S. push to
alter the laws of war to include anticipatory intervention in Iraq given the new threats
created by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Given the institutional
structures that have developed out of the U.S. version of the common law tradition,
with its heavy reliance on judicial lawmaking based on the distinguishing of facts (a
mode of lawmaking considered not only the norm but also essential to allow the law
to keep up with the times), the perception of the United States is that it is perfectly
natural to adapt international law by acting first and arguing about legal technicalities
later.21 This, however, is not the tradition in France, and therein lies the basis for
disagreement.
This essay explores the historical development of the French and U.S. legal
traditions, and how this affects each state's approach to international law. In doing
so, I focus on four factors that combine to support my theory that legal tradition
influences a state's treatment of international law. The first, and most important of
these, is the historical development oflaw and the legal tradition within the state. Any
theory of the relationship between law and society, whether domestic law or
international law, must rest on knowledge of the history of individual legal systems. 22
Understanding the historical circumstances surrounding the development of the French
and American legal traditions is crucial, because only by understanding the unique
historical characteristics present in each state during the formation of the rule of law

18. See Interview with Jacques Chirac, supra note 3. See also KAGAN,supra note I, for a general
discussion of France's preference for diplomacy. While Kagan's argument centers on France's use of
diplomacy as a substitute for its lack of power relative to the United States, which is not the position of this
paper, the historical discussion remains relevant.
19. Examples include the period leading up to World War II, when appeasement was preferred to
military action, and the Balkan crisis in the 1990s. For further discussion of France's preference for
diplomacy, see generally KAGAN,supra note I.
20. See Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements and U.S. Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 1997,
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh I O.htm.
21. See DAWSON,supra note 13, at xiii (noting that in the U.S., in contrast, "it seems obvious and
beyond dispute that the application of Jaw necessarily involves some new creation .... Conflict itself ...
is a major source of growth and change [and adjudication is the settlement of conflict].").
22. Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1122
( 1983); see also CLINTONROSSITER,THEAMERICAN
QUEST1790-1860: AN EMERGING
NATJONINSEARCH
OF IDENTITY,
UNITY,ANDMODERNITY
6 (1971) ("Ifwe are to arrive at a better understanding of this harsh
world and the kindlier one we would like to build, we must study the history of nations just as intensively
as we study the behavior of individuals.").
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can we understand the nature of the subsequent legal institutions and sources oflaw
that have developed, as well as the public perception of the role oflaw in society. In
other words, the legal tradition of a state is a constitutive factor, determining the
position of many components of society-all of which combine to provide the
framework under which decisions are made regarding international law.
The second factor is that a state's treatment of international law is influenced by
the legal and political institutions in the state. This institutional component arises
directly out of the historical development oflegal tradition. However, as the political
and legal institutions grow and solidify, they are not only constituted by the legal
tradition, but they themselves become constitutive mechanisms for the recognition of,
adherence to, and incorporation of international law within the law of the state. 23 Legal
and political institutions include the branches of government in the state, as well as the
separation of the branches and the powers bestowed on each (in particular, the powers
regarding international law and the ability to change or amend the laws). 24
The third component of the legal tradition that determines a state's treatment of
international law is the recognition of sources oflaw and the methods ofinterpretation
of these sources. Whether or not international law becomes part of the legal toolbox
that a state uses to make decisions about the appropriate course of action is determined
in large part by the ease with which the international rules are incorporated into the
domestic legal system. 25 Depending on what a legal system considers a source oflaw,
how international law fits into that categorization is a key determining factor.
Moreover, once an international legal rule becomes a source of law, the method of
interpretation for these rules can also influence how influential the international rules
ultimately are in guiding state behavior, as well as how free a state might feel to push
the boundaries of international legal norms.
The final component of legal tradition that contributes to a state's treatment of
international law is the population's understanding of law and of the role of law in
society. As with institutions and sources, public perception of law is greatly

23. Slaughter Burley, A Dual Agenda, supra note 8, at 228.
24. For a general discussion of the political and legal institutions of France and the United States, see
0UROSELLE,supra note 7; JEAN-MARIE01.JEHENNO,
L' A VEN1RDELALIBERTE:LA 0EMOCRATIEDANSLE
MONDIALISATION
(1999);PATRICEHIGONNET,SISTERREPUBLICS:THE0RIGINSOFFRENCHANDAMERICAN
REPUBLICANISM
(1988); Rogoff, supra note 12.
25. An understanding of the domestic legal tradition matters because it is at the domestic
level-whether government or public-where acknowledgement and adherence occur. International law
may be developed and agreed upon at the international level, among governments and diplomats; but it is
at the domestic level, among the population, where it gains its authority. International law is incorporated
into domestic legal orders-those legal orders founded on a state's historical legal tradition--so that all
citizens of a state, from the leaders to the general populace, are bound by its tenets-the tenets which form
the framework within which all decisions are made. However, depending on what the historical
development of the legal tradition has been and what legal institutions have come from such history, a state
may be more or less able to incorporate international law into its domestic legal framework. The easier the
incorporation, the more likely it will be that international law considerations form part of the basis for action
promoted by the population. In those states where it is more difficult ( or time-consuming) to transfer
international law from the level of diplomats to the level of domestic law, attention and adherence to
LAW20 (1985);
international law will be less. See FRANCISBOYLE,WORLDPOLITICSANDINTERNATIONAL
see also RICHARDA.FALK, THEROLEOFDOMESTICCOURTSINTHEINTERNATIONAL
LEGALORDER(1964),
for a discussion of the importance of national courts as instruments for incorporating international law.
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influenced by the historical development of the legal tradition within a given state. All
societies are products of their history, as are their understandings and beliefs about law
and what it is designed to do. This component is particularly important in a
democratic society such as France or the United States, in that the public's perception
of the appropriate course of action is a crucial factor in what the state does, regardless
of its legal tradition. 26 What people think about the law and the values embedded in
this thought have a great deal to do with how people behave and, ultimately, how they
expect their elected representatives to behave. 27 In fact, it has been said that public
opinion is international law's ''ultimate sanction." 28 Liberal democracies like France
and the United States base foreign policy decisions on popular support. 29
Ultimately, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the difference of opinion
between France and the United States on the issue of Iraq was not the monumental
split among allies that many proclaimed, but was instead just the latest in a series of
differing perspectives between the two nations on international law. Law is a primary
cornerstone of any society, shaping the perceptions of justice and the sense of right and
wrong within the society it governs. These perceptions and attitudes about law are
historically grounded and continually reinforced by a state's legal culture and
institutions. It is important to understand these differences in examining state behavior
in the international system and treatment of international law. Given the constantly
changing nature of the international community and the new problems that continually
arise, more situations like that of Iraq are likely to occur in the future. A better
understanding of each other's point of view may facilitate international agreement the
next time.
Ill. FRANCE

What then are the different legal traditions of France and the United States that
influence different attitudes towards international law? What follows is an examination of the historical legal tradition of each state as well as the political and legal
institutions, sources and methods of interpretation, and public perception of the role
of law.

A. Historical Development
The legal tradition of France arose over time to be one of the most influential legal
traditions in the world. 30 This tradition did not develop in isolation, but rather
incorporated forms oflaw and ideas about law from sources as varied as the Romans,
the Catholic Church, the German tribes, the Spanish theologians, and a succession of

26. On the selectorate, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Policy Failure and Political Survival: The
Contribution of Political Institutions, 43 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
147 (1999); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
et al., Testing Novel Implications.from the Selectorate Theory of War, 56 WORLDPOL.363 (2004). See also
BOYLE,supra note 25; Martin Rogoff, International Politics and The Rule of Law: The United States and
The International Court of Justice 7 B.U. INT'LL.J. 267 (1989).
27. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures a/Europe, 30 LAW& Soc'Y REV.55
(1996).
28. BOYLE,supra note 25, at 20.
29. See generally FALK,supra note 25.
30. DAVID, supra note 5, at v.
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some of the greatest political and legal thinkers of all time. 31 This combination of
influences has shaped not only the concept oflaw in France, but also the relationship
that the French legal tradition has with international law. Moreover, both the
historically unique circumstances surrounding the French Revolution and the beliefs
which emerged from its aftermath-which include the conception that political and
legal leaders are responsible for ensuring that law is observed and enforced-have
contributed to the understanding of the role of law in France. 32 Finally, France's
position at the center of Europe and its relationship to not only its European neighbors,
but also its former colonial territories around the globe, have combined to develop
among the French people a singular sense of state sovereignty and the role of France
in the world, a role many see as foundational to the appropriate conception of
international law.33
The historical roots of the French legal tradition can be traced to the early days of
the Roman Empire. 34 In fact, to this day, France has remained "continuously open to
influence from Roman law." 35 As part of the Roman Empire beginning with the first
century B.C., France received the foundational tenets ofRoman law as compiled in the
lex romana visigothorum in 506 A.D. 36 The laws of the Roman Empire were
sophisticated and diverse, as they were required to cover a vast territory encompassing
a multitude of different nations and ethnic groups, all with pre-existing local rules and
customs at the time of incorporation into the Roman Empire. By necessity the Roman
law developed a common law of nations: one capable of engendering order and

31. France, being at the center of Europe, was witness to most of the influential writings of the 15th 19th centuries on law and politics, including the works of the Glossators at the University of Bologna,
Aquinas, Vitoria, Las Casas, Sepulveda, Montaigne, Gentili, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Grotius,
Pufendorf, Vattel, Wolfe, Voltaire, Rousseau, Descartes, and Kant. For a general discussion of the
development of international law through the works of these authors, see Joachim Von Elbe, The Evolution
of the Concept of Just War in International Law, 33 AM.J. INT'LL. 665 (1939). See also INTERNATIONAL
TOTHEFIRSTWORLDwAR (Chris
GREEKS
TuOUGJIT:TExrs FROMTHEANCIENT
INPOLITICAL
RELATIONS
Brown et al. eds. 2002).
LAW(1998) for
OFFRENCH
PRINCIPLES
32. See JOHNBELL,SOPHIEBOYRON,& SIMONWHITIAKER,
French legal
modem
the
to
contributed
have
these
how
a discussion of the values underlying French law and
system.
33. This view that the French have had throughout their history about their place in the global system
and what they can offer others is referred to as la mission civilisatrice. Discussion of la mission civilisatrice
and what it has meant for the development of France's position in the world and French law can be found
IN FRENCH
RACISM,ANDEXOTICISM
NATIONALISM,
in TZVETANTOOOROV,ON HUMANDIVERSITY:
OFFRANCE
CMLIZATION
THE
CURTIUS,
ROBERT
ERNST
(Catherine Porter trans. 1993). See also
TuOUGHT
Rogoff,
(1982);
L'AUTRE
DE
QUESTION
LA
L'AMERIQUE:
DE
CONQU~TE
LA
TOOOROV,
(1932); TZVETAN
supra note 12.
34. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 263 ("In its history ... France ... remained continuously open to
influence from Roman law."). See generally DAVID,supra note 5.
supra note 13, at 263.
35. DAWSON,
INTHEWORLDTODAY,34 (2d ed.
MAIORLEGALSYSTEMS
36. RENEDAVID& JOHNE.C. BRIERLEY,
Northern part of France remained
The
France.
of
portion
Southern
the
in
true
1978). This was especially
The customary law of Northern
ecrit.
droit
de
pays
a
than
rather
for the most part a pays de droit coutumier,
gained the English throne
William
after
law
common
France, in fact, became the foundations for the English
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written
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Loire),
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discussion of the
further
For
reception of Roman law, to the point where local custom almost disappeared.
ETAL.,supra
GLENDON
13;
note
supra
DAWSON,
development of the Roman law in France, see generally
note 7.
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security in Roman territory, yet also providing unifying principles which regulated
such common activities as trade and treatment of government representatives in
foreign territories. 37 This early form of international law, or law between nations, is
still reflected in both our modern international law and in those countries, such as
France, that received the Roman law tradition.
French law developed from this early Roman law, both based on the codification
of the Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis by Justinian, and (more noticeably) from
the jus commune developed by the Glossators at the University of Bologna at the
beginning of the Renaissance. 38 The glosses and later commentaries in the 12th and
13th centuries adapted classical Roman law to the problems of the day. In doing so
they were heavily influenced by the new spirit of rational inquiry and freedom from
the literalism that characterized earlier Roman law. 39 Although France was still a
country with multitudes of individual laws and practices, 40 French law from the period
of the early 14th century until the time of the French Revolution in the late 18th
century steadily incorporated the treatises on Roman law coming out of the universities
across Europe.
These "French-Roman" foundations are responsible for a number of unique
characteristics of the French legal tradition that facilitate the modern day incorporation
of international law into the French system and shape French attitudes about law.
First, in addition to France, many if not most other countries belonging to the civil law
tradition share legal characteristics based on their historical ties to the Roman law.41
The resulting cohesiveness among these states in terms of general understandings of
law facilitates engagement in international relations without the types of misunderstandings that the United States and France have shared. Second, because the system
of Roman law itself incorporated components of international law, including laws
governing war, diplomacy, and trade, understanding and incorporating international
law into the domestic legal framework is a historical commonality for a country like
France. By comparison, the United States' history with international law did not begin
until the 18th century. 42
Besides Roman law, the most important historical influence on the development
of the French legal tradition and the French conception oflaw is the Canon law of the

37. On the Roman law generally, including further discussion ofthejus gentium, see J.L. BRIERLEY,
THELAWOFNATIONS
(6th ed. I 963); HAROLD
J. BERMAN,
LAWANDREVOLUTION:
THEFORMATION
OFTHE
WESTERN
LEGALTRADmON(1983); THOMAS
GLYNWATKIN,
ANHISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION
TOMODERN
CML LAW(1999).
38. France stretched across the main invasion routes in the northward advance of Roman law.
The south of France, roughly one-third the area of modem France, was already governed by
a vulgarized Roman law inherited from the earlier Middle Ages. In the late 1IOO's the
doctrines of the Bologna school were taught at Montpellier by Placentinus, himself one of
the well-known doctors of Bologna. Other men also who had been trained at Bologna lived
and wrote in twelfth century France.
supra note 13, at 263. See also GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7, at 48-49.
DAWSON,
39. GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7, at 48.
40. Voltaire famously noted that one traveling across France changed laws as often as one changed
horses. MICHAELBOGDAN,COMPARATIVELAW
167 (1994).
41. See generally DAYID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36; GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7.
42. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 100 (explaining that Roman law has helped maintain some attitudes
about law in France that differ from those held in the United States).
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Catholic Church. In the Middle Ages, after the Roman Empire fell, France lacked any
unifying authority or source of law. Into this breach rose the Catholic Church. 43
Subsequently, in the 11th and 12th centuries, the revival of Roman law combined with
the spread of the Canon law through the works of such eminent scholars as Thomas
Aquinas. This combination of Roman and Canon law allowed the latter's status as a
guiding force for the moral aspects of society to supplement the former's practical
utility.44 The fact that Canon law continued to influence French legal thought up to the
revolutionary period provides a crucial component of the French legal tradition.
France's historical ties to the moral principles of the Canon law ensured that
notions of morality and law working together to serve justice and the good of society
would remain a part of the French legal tradition. 45 This conception oflaw as the key
mechanism for protecting society as a whole is vital to understanding the French
perception of what law is and what it is supposed to accomplish. In the French
mindset, law is designed to protect society from the actions of bad individuals, and to
serve as the guiding principles for one's actions.
Moreover, like the Roman law, the Canon law took on international aspects. The
impetus of much of the discussion of international law within the Canon law was, in
fact, the discovery of the Americas and the concomitant questions about humanity and
law that occurred upon the discovery of new races of people. As Spanish theologians
and French philosophers struggled with the task of applying the Canon law to these
new civilizations around the world, they honed and elaborated principles of the laws
of nations that had first begun with the Romans. 46 The Spanish theologians Vitoria and
Las Casas, for example, argued that a law of sovereignty existed which applied to all
humans, and was inviolable barring a direct attack on one's own person. 47 After
reading the works of these theologians, Montaigne questioned the wisdom of the
French government's position on laws and rules concerning the new territories.
Montaigne's position was later taken up by Rousseau and refined into the Enlightenment principles of liberte, egalite, andfraternite, principles that formed the basis of
the French Revolution and the legal system that eventually developed from it.48
As in the case of French law, international law carries with it many foundations,
including the concepts of morality and justice. Much of international law rests on

43. GLENDONETAL., supra note 7, at 22-23.
44. DAVID& BRIERLEY,supra note 36, at 39-40; DAWSON,supra note I 3, at 279 (Canon law borrowed
from the conceptual frameworks and vocabulary of the Roman law, and the connections between the two
laws were "always close.").
45. See generally DAWSON,supra note 13; GLENDONETAL., supra note 7.
46. See Von Elbe, supra note 31. This debate, which originally centered on the Spanish scholars such
as Vitoria, Sepulveda, and Las Casas, was incorporated into French dialogue through the writings ofFrench
thinkers such as Montaigne and Montesquieu.
47. For an in-depth discussion on the Valladolid Debate of 1550 between Las Casas and Sepulveda,
including a discussion of Vitoria's and Las Casas' position, see LEWISHANKE,
THESPANISHSTRUGGLE
FOR
JUSTICEIN THE CONQUESTOF AMERICA(2002) (1949).
48. See MONTAIGNE,supra note 11, at 228-241 (for his essay 'On the Cannibals'); ROUSSEAU,supra
note 11. For a more detailed discussion, see Rogoff, supra note 12, at 51-52 ("Rousseau's ideas continue
to express the feelings of the French toward their fundamental Jaw-which since 1791 has been embodied
in a succession of written constitutions. The fundamental Jaw must be malleable; it must express the current
will of the people.").
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general rules designed to guide behavior, so that actions taken by any one state are not
harmful to the international community as a whole. Many international rules feature
undertones of morality and a sense of justice, which are akin to the French conceptions
oflaw and its role. Because the French view oflaw generally has these historical ties,
the act of understanding and incorporating international law is not particularly foreign
to the French.
The period surrounding the French Revolution is a crucial one for both the
solidification of the foundational principles of the French legal tradition and the
development of the modern French legal institutions. From the 15th century onward,
as French scholars were returning from Bologna with new Roman law, the French
nation was beginning to centralize, creating the need for a uniform French law.49 This
came, at first, through both royal ordinance and the creation at the end of the 13th
century of the parlements, "specialized group[ s]" of men who, "shortly after 1250
began to hold regular sessions that were primarily devoted to judicial business. " 50 In
theory, the parlements would apply the law fairly to all people. However, in practice,
they became corrupt and abused their power for the benefit of their members and the
noble classes. 51
These actions would ultimately have a profound influence on the development of
the French legal tradition, and most importantly, on the development of French legal
institutions after the French Revolution. The reaction to the corruption of the
parlements has structured the role of the French legal institutions ever since, in such
a way as to minimize the power of the judicial branch in favor of the legislative, and
particularly after de Gaulle, the executive branches of the government. 52 The reaction
also had a great effect on the treatment of international law by France; since that time
the incorporation of international legal rules, as with the creation of all law, has
remained primarily within the realms of the non-judicial branches of government.
Ultimately, the actions of the parlements, coupled with those of the monarchy, led
to the French Revolution. 53 The Revolution was a turning point in the development of
the French legal tradition, because it caused a shift in both French institutions-one
which continued into the 20th century-and the perception of the population of France
regarding the correct role oflaw in society. Most significantly, the Revolution raised
awareness among the population as to the government's obligations to the French

49. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 348.
50. Id. at 274. For discussion of the history of the parlements, see id. at 273-90 and HIGONNET,supra
note 24, at 79-80.
supra note 7, at 12; DAWSON,supra note 13, at 369.
51. DUROSELLE,
52. On the subjugation of the judiciary immediately after the French Revolution, see DAWSON,supra
note 13, at 375-376 ("The leaders of the French Revolution soon undertook the urgent task of subjugating
the judiciary."); see also JOHNHENRYMERRYMAN,THE CIVILLAWTRAomoN: EUROPE,LATINAMERICA
AND EAST ASIA 447 (1994) ("All the institutions of the ancient regime were rooted out in very short
order .... In its place was put the vision of the Enlightened Society, as sketched by Diderot, Voltaire, and
Rousseau: according to this, man is a rational and responsible creature who acquires at birth an inalienable
right to freedom of conscience, belief, and economic activity."). For a discussion of the integral role
Generale de Gaulle played in strengthening the Executive branch of the French government at the expense
of Parliament, see Rogoff, supra note 12, at 63.
53. For a general discussion on the causes of the French Revolution, see DUROSELLE,supra note 7;
HIGONNET,supra note 24.
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people and the state concerning the rule oflaw. 54 In this new French view, the focus
is on the individual's dependence on civil society such that the goal of law is not so
much the protection ofindividual rights, but rather the dissemination of rules regarding
the fundamental duties one owes to the cornmunity. 55 The primary goal oflaw, under
this conception, is the betterment of all, which takes precedence over protections for
the individual. 56
While the underlying values of the French legal tradition remained uncertain
during the 19th century, the legal institutions which developed post-revolution
continued to thrive, despite the continuous shift in govemment. 57 The Napoleonic
Code of 1804, 58 drafted under the rule of Napoleon, adopted many of the principles
found in Justinian's Code while reflecting the political and social revolution. 59 The
Code incorporates a melange of sources, including Roman law, Canon law, customary
law, and doctrines established by pre-revolutionary court decisions. 60 It forms the
heart of French identification with the law and their legal culture, having a ''very
unique and central role in the French legal system, and even in French culture as a
whole." 61 The Code remains, in many respects, unchanged today, and still reflects the
fundamental ideology behind the Code's rules: an ideology based on the belief in law

54. MERRYMAN,
supra note 52, at 443 ("The emphasis on the rights of man in the revolutionary period
produced statements about individual liberty of the sort found ... in the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen." Examples included the "right of a man to own property" and "the obligation
of the law to protect his ownership" as well as the "right to conduct his own affairs and to move laterally
and vertically in society." This was a reaction to ''the tendency under feudalism to fix a man in place and
status."). For a discussion of the public sentiment rising out of the French Revolution in terms of the role
of government and its obligations to the citizenry as captured in the writings of Rousseau, see Rogoff, supra
note 12, at 53-54.
55. BOYLE,supra note 25, at 65.
56. See id.; see generally ROUSSEAU,supra note 11 ( calling for the establishment of social duty over
individual right). It should be noted that after the Revolution, the French people clamored for a centralized
law that would protect the interests of the people and ensure a functioning society. BOGDAN,supra note 40,
at 168; GLENDONET AL., supra note 7, at 52-53. In response, the National Assembly, in the years
immediately following the Revolution, "made individualism the new pivot of social and economic life."
HIGONNET,supra note 24, at 2-3. Individual protections, rather than those of society, were seen as the goal
of the state and the laws. This focus on individualism, however, did not last. The concept of law as a
protection for all people was subsumed in the re-emergence of totalitarian forms of rule. Four years after
the Revolution, in fact, Robespierre's rise to power meant that these policies regarding individualism would
be reversed and individualism restrained. While this restraint started out under the rubric of a better
government for society as a whole, the result was instead a crackdown on any form of individual liberty or
any manifestation of the rule of law and a resulting return to "arbitrary, monarchic rule "-an early form
of modem totalitarianism. Thus, although the French Revolution was initially based on the same principles
as the American Revolution, unlike the United States-which continued to grow and develop without pause
based on the cause of individual liberty-France lost the principles of the Revolution rather quickly and they
did not return to France until a century later. Id.
57. From the time of the French Revolution in 1789, France has had "two monarchies, two empires,
and five republics." HIGONNET,supra note 24, at 274.
58. This consisted of five separate codes: the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure,
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Commercial Code. BOGDAN,supra note 40, at 168.
59. See GLENDONET AL., supra note 7, at 53.
60. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 349.
61. BOGDAN,supra note 40, at 169.
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and justice for the community and the common sense of human beings. 62 The Napoleonic Code provides the basic structure and foundation for the legal institutions
present in France today, in both the civil and criminal law arenas. 63 This body oflaw
encompassed the historical influences of Roman and Canon law. It then spread
throughout the French empire begun by Napoleon and continued through the first half
of the 20th century. Accordingly, today's French code and legal institutions have long
historical experience with concepts of the law of nations. This historical familiarity
informs the modern day approach to international law taken by the French. It provides
both a more ready means of incorporating international law into the domestic law of
France, and a more ingrained sense among the French people that international law is
another set of rules designed to protect society and the community as a whole, and is
thus a form of law to be obeyed.

B. Legal Institutions
While important in its own right as the constitutive element of the role oflaw in
France today, France's particular legal history is also crucial in explaining the French
treatment of international law because of the legal and political institutions that have
developed out of this history. The legal tradition in France greatly influenced the
creation of new political institutions after the French Revolution and continues to
influence French institutions today. After the Revolution, as the French Republic was
created, much attention was paid to creating governmental and legal institutions that
would serve the goals of the people, rather than the goals of the upper classes. 64
Among the most important of these institutional structures are the separation of powers
and the relative levels of power accorded to the various branches of government in the
area oflawmaking-whether by enacting domestic law or incorporating international
law.
The French government maintains a separation of powers, as do most democratic
states in the world today. 65 However, French institutions, their powers, and the
separation of these powers have changed periodically since the end of the French
Revolution. France has experienced a variety of institutional structures since 1789.66
However, no matter which period of history one considers-from the empire of
Napoleon to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics-the separation of powers has
always split the preponderance of the power between the legislative and executive

62. Id
63. See DAVID,supra note 5, at vii.
64. This was ensured by the subordination of the court to the legislature in drawing up postRevolutionary separation of powers. See DAWSON,supra note 13, at 374-378; DAVID,supra note 5, at 27
("Frenchmen have always had some difficulty ... thinking of the courts as exercising a 'power' comparable
to those exercised by Parliament and the executive"); MERRYMAN,supra note 52, at 44 7 ("The state is
bound through its legislation to free its citizens from the traditional authority of feudal, church, family, guild,
and status groups, and to equip all citizens with equal rights.") and at 450 ("Fear of a 'gouvemement des
juges' hovered over French post-revolutionary reforms and colored the codification process. The emphasis
on complete separation of powers, with all lawmaking power lodged in a representative legislature, was a
way of insuring that the judiciary would be denied lawmaking power.").
65. For a more detailed discussion of the institutions of the French government, see Rogoff, supra note
12.
66. See supra note 57.

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 353 2006

354

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2

branches, leaving the judicial branch with minimal powers. 67 This institutional
structure, in turn, affects the incorporation of international law into the domestic law
of France.
The French legislature, together with (since the era of de Gaulle and the creation
of the Fifth Republic) the French executive, maintains the almost exclusive authority
to draft and pass new laws.68 The Executive alone maintains the preponderance of
power to negotiate and sign foreign treaties binding France to international law.69 In
turn, because of the heavy emphasis in France on law being made by the representative
branches of government, the judiciary has a very minimal role in either deciding
whether an international legal rule is valid in France, or how that rule should be
applied. 70
The French judiciary's powers of review are minimal; except for the special role
of the Constitutional Council, the judiciary does not have the power to declare any act
of Parliament void. 71 Moreover, the French judiciary has limited powers in deciding
the cases that come before them. French judges are expected to render their decision
based strictly on interpretation of existing codes and statutes. 72 They, generally, do not
have the authority to make law with judicial decisions, but must instead interpret the
law as made by the legislature. 73 This role for the French judiciary is rooted in the
population's history of resentment of judicial abuses prior to the Revolution. 74
Traditionally, the judiciary in France, as members of the upper class and often servants
of the king, were seen as unjust in their decision-making. 75 Prior to the French

67. See GLENDONETAL., supra note 7, at 83; MERRYMAN,supra note 52, at 450.
68. See generally Martin A. Rogoff, The French (R)Evolution OJ1958-1998, 3 CoLUM. J. EUR.L. 453
(1997-98).
69. 1958 CONST.52-53.
70. For a discussion of the changes that have occurred in the French institutional structure since the
enactment of the 1958 Constitution, see generally Rogoff, supra note 68. There are instances where the
French courts have taken the initiative in determining whether or not a particular international rule is valid
as French law, or how to interpret an international legal rule. These cases have come most often over the
past fifty years in the form of decisions over France's obligations as a member of the European Union. See,
for example, the Cafe Jacques Vabre (1975) case in which the French Cour de Cassation determined that
French Courts, in accordance with European Union law, could make determinations on the validity of
legislative provisions under French treaty obligations. This decision essentially provided French courts with
a modicum of judicial review over state actions in terms of compliance with international law, but did not
extend this review to conformity with the French Constitution. See Cafe Jacques Vabre, Cass. ch. mixte,
May 24, 1975, D.1975.497, reprinted in FRAN<;OIS
TERRE& YVESLEQUETIE,LES GRANDSARRETSDELA
JURISPRUDENCE
CMLE 15 ( 1994).
71. The French Constitutional Council may review a law, prior to the law's enactment, to ensure
conformity with the Constitution: "Institutional Acts, before their promulgation, and the rules of procedure
of the parliamentary assemblies, before their entry into force, must be referred to the Constitutional Council,
which shall rule on their conformity with the Constitution." 1958 CONST.61.
72. DAVID& BRIERLEY,supra note 36, at 122-23.
73. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 392 ("Law-making was not for the judiciary or the executive; it was
entirely reserved for the legislature. From this monopoly of the law-making function it seemed to follow
that the only worthy subject of the interpreter's attention was code or statute, duly invested of the legislator's
sanction.").
74. GLENDONETAL., supra note 7, at 82-83.
75. DAYID,supra note 5, at 11 ("The chief reason for undertaking codification and carrying it through
to completion was practical. The diversity of customary law and the overall lack of uniformity in French
law could no longer be justified" post-Revolution.). See also DAYID,supra note 5, at 23 (stating that the

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 354 2006

2006]

THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION

355

Revolution,judges were widely seen as a tool of the wealthy, used to keep the masses
subjugated. 76 Judgeships in France were often passed through noble families or made
available for sale to the highest bidder. 77
78
Although
The French Revolution resulted in very different roles for judges.
judges, as the original center of opposition to the authoritarian government, were
actually responsible for the instigation of the French Revolution, from the days of the
Revolution forward they have been held in a state of distrust. 79 Accordingly, when the
post-Revolution French legal system was created, the judiciary received very little
power. 80 To the extent that the French believe law exists to protect and serve the
people of the country as a whole (i.e., to ensure a good society), 81 they believe that the
making of law should be left to the legislature or the President (as the elected,
representative body of the people), and should not be in the hands of the judiciary (as
a non-elected body of government employees who have no responsibility to the
population as a whole).
France is also a monist system in terms of the incorporation of international law
into the domestic legal structure. 82 Once ratified by the Executive or National
Assembly, the treaty becomes law in France without further execution necessary by
the government. 83 Moreover, neither the legislature nor the courts have the authority
84
This
to alter the provisions of the treaty through reservations or understandings.
means that treaties, once ratified by the French government, become law in France on
par with, and treated the same as, domestic law. 85 This streamlined process for

parlements "made themselves very unpopular" through their defense of "an antiquated system based on the
inequality of social classes and on self-serving premises").
76. Id
77. Moreover, "since the normal turnover (of judgeships] through death or resignation did not bring in
money fast enough, new judgeships and other offices were created .... " DAWSON,supra note 13, at 352.
78. Id. at 370.
79. Id.
80. See generally 2 HERBERTM. KRITZER,LEGALSYSTEMSOFTHEWORLD:A POLITICALSOCIALAND
551 (2002).
ENCYCLOPEDIA
CULTURAL
81. "Le but de la societe est le bonheur commun. " Constitution du 24 juin 1793 Declaration des droits
de l'homme et du citoyen (I 795). For a discussion of how French judges maintain a different attitude
towards international law, see BOYLE,supra note 25.
82. Pierre Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in
NATIONALTREATYLAW AND PRACTICE13 (Monroe Leigh & Merritt R. Blakeslee eds. 1995). For a
LAWCOURSEBOOK
discussion of monism versus dualism, see ANTHONYD'AMATO, AN INTERNATIONAL
ch. II (1997).
83. Eisemann & Kessedjian, supra note 82, at 13.
84. Id.
85. Article 53 of the French Constitution of I 958 provides for when treaties require ratification by
Parliament versus ratification by act of the President:
Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements relating to international
organization, those that commit the finances of the State, those that modify provisions which
are matters for statute, those relating to the status of persons, and those that involve the
cession, exchange or addition of territory, may be ratified or approved only by virtue of an
Act of Parliament.
1958 CONST.53. Further, Article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 states: "Treaties or agreements duly
ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each
agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party." 1958 CONST.55.
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ratification and publication, combined with the potential for the French public's direct
participation in the treaty process through public referendum 86 and the great public
interest in France's position regarding international law, 87 facilitates the recognition
and incorporation of international law into the French legal system.

C. Sources of Law, Interpretation, and Change
Closely related to the physical legal institutions that have developed in France out
of the French legal tradition are the sources of law these legal institutions tum to in
order to define the appropriate standards of behavior. As judges themselves are not
involved in the making oflaw on a case-by-case basis, the recognized sources oflaw
become all the more important for determining what the legal rules actually are. 88
Moreover, it is important to examine the explicit position given to international law in
the French legal structure, as the ease with which international legal rules can become
binding on the French population as a whole determines the framework in which
government decisions are taken regarding French action in the international system.
In France, as with both the Roman law and the Canon law, one of the primary
sources oflaw has historically been the writings oflegal scholars and jurists. 89 While
this diminished slightly in importance during the latter part of the 20th century, 90 the
publications of eminent legal scholars on various legal subfields are still relied on by
the legislature in drafting new law and by the judiciary in interpreting law. 91 They are
regarded as authoritative indicators of both the current state of the law and the
perceptions and preferences of the French population concerning the law. 92 This is
especially true in terms ofinternational law, a branch oflaw which has long been the
realm of legal scholars as opposed to legislators. 93 Legal scholarship plays a
significant role in providing French jurists and lawmakers with an assessment of the

86. 1958 CONST.11.
The President of the Republic may, on a proposal from the Government when Parliament is
in session or on a joint motion of the two assemblies, published in either case in the Journal
officiel, submit to a referendum any government bill which ... provides for authorization to
ratify a treaty that, although not contrary to the Constitution, would affect the functioning
of the institutions.
Id.

87. See discussion infra Part 11.D.
88. See supra note 70.
89. See DAVID&BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 134; DAVID,supra note 5, at ix. While in the early days
of the Roman legal system laws were made on a case-by-case basis, by the tum of the millennium these
decisions of the jurisconsults began to be codified in written volumes, which were eventually synthesized
into the Corpus Juris Civilis. On the history of Roman law, see supra notes 36-38.
90. See DAVID&BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 134; GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7, at 210.
91. See DAVID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 134; GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7, at 210.
92. GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7, at 210 ("[T)he importance of the academics' function in presenting
analyses of cases and statutes to judges and lawyers is hard to overestimate."). For a brief discussion of the
role of scholarly opinion in the broader legal system see DAVID,supra note 5, at 80-81.
93. See generally MALcOLMSHAW,INTERNATIONAL
LAW91 (5th ed. 2003) ("Historically ... the
influence of academic writers on the development of international law has been marked."); MARKJANIS,
ANINTRODUCTION
TOINTERNATIONAL
LAw 80 (3rd ed. 1999) ("[T]he doctrines of scholars have played a
surprisingly important part in the development of international law.").
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various issues in foreign jurisdictions and international law, and informs the public as
to the international legal rules to which their state is bound.
As a result of these academic roots, the civil law tradition in France developed
with a much deeper focus on ''the systematic, philosophical, and structural side of the
law." 94 In fact, in conformity with history, the civil law tradition remains a system that
can be described as a jurist's law.95 International law originated as a law of scholars,
and the close relation the French legal tradition has to these writings facilitates even
today its incorporation of these historical international law ideas and their modem
descendants into French law.96
For the French lawyer, jurist, or layperson, la loi, referring to the detailed rules
which society must follow, coexists with le droit, referring to the broader concept of
the law as an ideal and guiding principle for society. While the idealized concepts of
le droit have never been entirely adopted as concrete rules, la loi-that which comes
from the legislature and the executive--has never been regarded by scholars or the
general population as the true law.97 This understanding of the law, so different from
a common law understanding by which the law is a single entity stemming from the
work of the courts, is a core component of the entire French legal tradition. It forms
the foundation of not only the French understanding of the sources oflaw, but also the
public perception of how law is designed to function in and for society. It follows that
France "place[s] case law far down on the scale among available sources oflaw." 98
In addition to the sources of law themselves, the actual methods of interpretation
used by scholars, judges, and others influence the way in which a state approaches
international law. Modes of legal reasoning include formal versus pragmatic,
deductive versus inductive, and abstract versus contextual. 99 These different modes
provide different methods ofinterpretation and application of the law. In France, legal
interpreters use deductive reasoning, in which the responsibility of the judge is to
apply general principles already in existence to specific facts without unique interpretation or the creation of new law. 100 Although these differences may seem subtle, they
play a significant role in how law is created and perceived in the different legal

94. Alan Watson, supra note 22, at 1131.
95. DAVID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 98.
96. Modem international law stems directly from the work of European scholars working between the
15th and 18th centuries, including Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, and Kant. These works form
a canon of legal scholarship and theory studied by Continental lawyers, but often ignored by their common
law counterparts. For a discussion of the role of the scholar in French law and international law, see supra
notes 92 and 93. For a discussion of the historical origins of internationallaw, see generally Von Elbe, supra
note 31; see also SHAW,supra note 93, at 12-30.
97. DAVID,supra note 5, at ix.
98. DAWSON,
supra note 13, at 374; DAVID,supra note 5, at ix. It should be noted, however, that the
use of case law as a source of law is becoming more common in France. See generally Rogoff, supra note
68; see also GLENDON
ETAL.,supra note 7.
99. See Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community Legal System
from the Ground Up: The Role of Individual Litigants in National Courts (Jean Monnet Work Papers Series,
No. 6, 1996), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9606ind.htm1.
100. For a more general discussion of methods of interpretation in France and the United States see
MIRJANR. DAMASKA,
THEFACESOFJUSTICE
ANDSTATEAUTHORITY:
A COMPARATNEAPPROACH
TOTHE
LEGAL
PROCESS(1986); Mirjan R. Dam~ka, Reflections on American Constitutionalism, 38 AM.J. COMP.
ETAL.,supra note 7.
L. 421 (Supp. 1990). See generally GLENDON
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traditions. A country like France would rarely countenance the application of a new
legal rule prior to its being promulgated by the law-making body (in domestic law, the
Parliament; in international law, the international community under the rubric of the
United Nations). Moreover, the French see law as an elemental force in their
society, 101 so it can be difficult to change, in the sense that it is always more difficult
to change foundations than outer structures. The law can be changed, of course, but
this change must come through an amendment to existing code provisions or statute,
rather than through judicial decision. 102 Although seemingly the operation of the
French legal system does not operate at any slower pace than that of the United States,
the underlying philosophy about sources oflaw, interpretation, and change in the law
does, I suggest, have an effect on the approach France takes towards international law.
D. Public Perception of the Role of Law

The role of the public in the approach of a state to international law is also
important to consider, especially in democracies where the government is responsible
to the people for the laws, and the people will use their perception of laws and their
role in society to judge the appropriateness of state action according to their
historically-developed notions of justice. 103 Legal rules are rooted in social norms and
values, and the legal tradition frames the notions of what a society believes is just.
What people think about the law and the values embedded therein has much to do with
how they behave, as well as significant consequences for the larger political and legal
systems. In general, attitudes toward the rule of law likely influence a people's
willingness to comply with the law. 104 France provides an illustration of how this
mechanism works.
As mentioned above, law in France has long been a communal endeavor. 105
Students are educated in law from an early age, and the public participation in the
development of French law is substantial. As the French legal scholar Rene David has
stated, "Among the peoples of Europe the French probably hold law in the greatest
esteem. " 106 By way of example, issues of legal structure and judicial fairness played

IOI. DAVID,supra note 5, at 75.
I 02. For example, if France has ratified an international treaty, but it is determined by the Constitutional
Council that the treaty may contradict an existing provision of the French Constitution, then rather than the
Court providing a legal interpretation of the treaty, the Constitution must be amended before the treaty
provisions officially enter into force. The French Constitution states:
If the Constitutional Council, on a reference from the President of the Republic, from the
Prime Minister, from the President of one or the other assembly, or from sixty deputies or
sixty senators, has declared that an international commitment contains a clause contrary to
the Constitution, authorization to ratify or approve the international commitment in question
may be given only after amendment of the Constitution.
1958 CONST. 54.
103. For a discussion of the logic of appropriateness concerning state action, see James G. March &
Johan P. Olson, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998);
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG.
887 (1998).
104. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 27.
105. See supra notes 55-56.
106. DAVID,supra note 5, at 75.
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a key role alongside rights and freedoms in the French Revolution. 107 Moreover, from
the beginning ofNapoleon's attempts to codify French law, public elementary schools
were charged with providing rudimentary lectures on law, not for the purpose of
creating new lawyers or judges, but in order to create "virtuous citizens" by giving
children an understanding of the role oflaw. 108 Napoleon also ordered the creation of
ten new law schools, bringing the study of law back into importance after decades of
disrespect. 109 In France, law is "not simply a matter for lawyers." 110 A general
knowledge of the law is highly valued, and an understanding oflaw and legal history
is considered "an almost essential element" of a well-rounded education. 111 Law is
historically seen as superior to politics-perhaps a reflection of the idealistic view of
le droit which places justice above politics. 112
This extensive French involvement with the law as part of the course of everyday
life means that the French public plays a large role in the French attitude towards
international law as well. The French population, having long experience with
international relations and the importance of international law, remains active in
ensuring that the actions of the French government incorporate the popular will on
international legal issues, whether it be ratifying a human rights treaty, rejecting the
European Constitution, or staying out of Iraq. Regarding the last of these issues,
Europeans in general, and perhaps the French in particular, see little in their long
experience to support the notion that force and occupation can bring democracy to the
Arab world. 113 This historical pessimism, combined with an extensive and devastating
experience with war, helps foster France's reluctance to embrace new visions of preemptive intervention. 114

107, See HIGONNET,supra note 24.
108. DAWSON,supra note 13, at 386.
109. Id. at 387.
I 10. DAVID,supra note 5, at ix.
ll I. Id. at 51, 73.
112. Id. at ix.
113. Justin Vaisee, Making Sense of French Foreign Policy, in IN THENATIONALINTEREST(July 2,
2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu.
114. Id. A global survey has revealed that Europeans and Americans do share similar views as to the
biggest threats to global security: international terrorism; North Korea's and Iran's access to weapons of
mass destruction; Islamic fundamentalism; and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These similarities closely track
statements made by the two governments over their shared goals for Iraq. However, Europeans and
Americans sharply disagree, as do their leaders, over the use of military force to deal with global threats.
Approximately 84 percent of Americans have said war may be used to achieve justice, while only 48 percent
of Europeans agree, and 78 percent of Europeans, compared with 67 percent of Americans, believe U.S.
unilateralism poses a possible international threat over the next ten years. And while both groups support
strengthening the United Nations, 57 percent of Americans are prepared to bypass the world organization
when vital interests are at stake, while only about 40 percent of Europeans say they would do so. Glenn
Frankel, Poll: Opposition to U.S. Policy Grows In Europe, WASH.POST.Sept. 4, 2003 at A 15. These figures
reflect the different perceptions the French and the Americans maintain towards international law,
particularly in terms of the United States' willingness to push the boundaries of definition of anticipatory
intervention. The French view on the matter supported the ultimate French position-a position, as
discussed here, that reflects many of the components of the historical French legal tradition and
institutions-that the best course of action to take in regards to Iraq was to continue diplomatic negotiations
through the United Nations, adhering to existing understanding of the laws of intervention that required a
threat of imminent attack.
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IV. THE UNITED STA TES

A. Historical Development
Contrary to the development of the French legal tradition, the legal tradition of the
United States developed in isolation, only tangentially tied to the English common law
upon which it was founded. 115 The first English settlers to North America brought with
them, by judicial decree, English common law. 116 The common law of England at the
time of the founding of the United States was a very different system of law than was
in place in France. Although England, like France, was a monarchy, a centralized
judicial system had been in place since the reign of William the Conqueror in the 11th
century. 117 William created in England a system oflaws and courts-available to all
citizens of England, and featuring the use of writs and the operation of a centralized
court structure which culminated in an appeal directly to the King-which still remains
much the same today. Furthermore, England was geographically isolated from the rest
of continental Europe. This kept it predominantly free from outside influence,
including that of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. As a result, early
English legal development centered on a body of case law built through judicial
decisions, and was seen primarily as a means of solving disputes. 118 This meant that
legal cases centered on the specifics of each dispute as outlined in each available form
of action, rather than on general principles of justice. 119 This fundamental difference
in the approach to law between common law states such as the United States, and civil
law states such as France, forms the core basis for the different approaches the two
states take to international law. The manner in which law is created and applied in the
two countries-through case decision in the United States and through written doctrine
in France-ties the historical development of each legal tradition to the modem view
oflaw and determines the ease with which international law is viewed as a part of the
modem legal system.
Despite the rejection of many English institutional structures by the United States
colonists, the English system of law creation which centered on judicial decision and
dispute resolution proved to be useful for the new colonies, due to its flexibility and
scalability. 120 However, American legal culture was based not on a sovereign
authority, but instead on freedom and independence, in keeping with the American
colonists' perception of what the role oflaw should be in their new society. 121 Thus,

115. DAYID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 375.
116. This was decreed by English judicial decision in Calvin ·s Case, 7 Co. Rep. I a, 77 Eng. Rep. 3 77
(1608). English subjects carry with them the common law of England when they settle in new lands that are
not already under control of civilized nations. This applies unless circumstances in the new territory are
such that the English common law cannot be adapted to local institutions and circumstances. See DAYID&
supra note 36, at 369.
BRIERLEY,
117. For a general discussion of English legal history see DAVID&BRIERLEY,
supra note 36; GLENDON,
FOUNDATIONS
OFTHE COMMONLAW,Butterworth &
ETAL., supra note 7; S.F.C. MILSOM,HISTORICAL
Co. (1981); R.C. VANCAENEGEM,
THEBIRTHOFENGLISHCOMMONLAW(2d
ed. 1989).
I 18. DAVID,supra note 5, at 73.
119. Id.
120. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 7, at 40.
121. Id. at 41; DAVID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 369-70.
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rather than rely on the body of case law built within the royal courts in England, the
colonists set up their own court structure, with new courts which could refer to English
law but whose primary mission was to create their own laws which identified with the
spirit of the new country. 122 These ideals were reinforced by both the American
Revolution and the founding documents of the new nation (the Declaration of
Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights).
In this way, the legal tradition of the United States developed based on the goal
of protecting individual rights above all else, combined with a definitive separation of
powers and a provision of power for the judiciary. 123 Each of these components, to
some extent, contradicts those characteristics that formed the early French legal
tradition. 124 The American legal system that emerged out of the American Revolution,
and the focus on republican ideals, led to the development of unique institutions which
125
This,
were unlike any that would develop in Europe for at least another 100 years.
"exceptional"
being
as
States
United
young
the
of
coupled with the general perception
-as having a "Manifest Destiny"-led to both an institutional development and a
public perception of the role of law in society that differed greatly from that of
France. 126 The United States legal culture that developed in the early 19th century saw
law as a dynamic, rather than static, tool of the masses that could be used to "harness
the energy" latent in the new republic. 127
Although the founders of the United States were, like the French, children of the
Enlightenment, the works of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau took on a different
meaning in the United States, largely due to geography and circumstance. In the
United States, Locke's belief that man creates civil society for the purpose of
protecting individual rights such as life, liberty, and property formed the foundations
of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. 128 By focusing on the views of Locke
regarding civil society, rather than the views of Rousseau (which were so influential
in France), the American people adopted as their mantra a focus on individualism. In
this paradigm, law must exist to order society, but this order comes through the
protection of the interests of the individual rather than the community. 129
After the Revolution, between 1776 and 1787, Americans moved to "forge a new
political consciousness that resolved the tensions of their historical experience,"
reconciling it with their unique position as a new state. 130 America became

supra note 7, at 40-41.
122. FRIEDMAN,
123. Id. at 122.
124. As discussed above, although initially the laws post-revolution in France were based on the same
individualistic foundations as in the United States, within four short years this had been reversed as the
promise of a republic of the people gave way once again to authoritarian rule.
QUEST12 (1971).
THEAMERICAN
ROSSITER,
supra note 36, at 371; CLINTON
125. DAVID&BRIERLEY,
supra note 24.
126. HIGONNET,
supra note 7, at 114; Rogoff, supra note 12, at 38 ("The dominant ideology in the
127. FRIEDMAN,
United States is that each person can advance to the full extent of his talents and ambition. The principal
function of government is the protection of this liberty of individual action."); for a more general discussion
supra note 12S.
of the development of the United States during the 18th and 19th centuries, see ROSSITER,
318.
at
11,
note
supra
LOCKE,
see
discussion
Locke's
for
25;
note
supra
128. BOYLE,
129. For further discussion of Locke's influence see BOYLE,supra note 25, at 64-65.
supra note 24, at 4-S.
130. HIGONNET,
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"fundamentally individualistic" in its social forms. 131 This belief has persisted to the
present day, providing remarkable consistency in the American tradition. Rooted in
essentially a single source, and developing from a single set of principles outlined by
the American Revolution, the United States' legal tradition has maintained both its
basic tenets and its basic institutional structure since the end of the 18th century. This
consistency has also provided invariance with respect to the United States' approach
to international law. Notwithstanding occasional idiosyncrasies due to the personality
traits of particular presidents, the United States has maintained a fairly consistent view
of international law since its inception. While the United States supports the rules of
international law as essential components of a just society, it also commonly works
within the international legal system in order to push the boundaries oflegality so that
it can pursue its individual interests, just as individuals commonly resort to American
courts to advance their own causes. 132 To maintain that stare decisis can be trumped
by the presence of new facts is a quintessential American legal pastime, and for the
United States, the Iraq situation post-9/l l provided a sterling example of the
applicability of this stratagem.

B. Legal Institutions
The legal institutions that have developed in the United States, also stemming
from the time of the American Revolution, further support this approach. Like the
development of the French legal institutions, the U.S. system began with the division
of powers among different branches of government. 133 Unlike the French system,
however, the powers separated in the United States included substantial powers for the
judiciary, including the power of judicial review. 134 The Court's assumption of the
power to review the actions of the other branches of government is a clear illustration
of the different roles of the judiciary in the United States and France. French courts

131. Id.
132. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience .... Americans do not argue, even to
themselves, that their actions may be justified by raison d'etat. They do not claim the right
of the stronger or insist to the rest of the world, as the Athenians did at Metos, that "the
strong rule where they can and the weak suffer what they must." Americans have never
accepted the principles of Europe's old order .... The United States is a liberal, progressive
society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe
it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world
order. Americans even share Europe's aspirations for a more orderly world system based
not on power but on rules-after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans
were still extolling the Jaws of Machtpolitik. But while these common ideals and aspirations
shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very
different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world.
KAGAN,supra note I, at 41-42.
133. For a general discussion of the development of U.S. institutions see DAMASKA,
supra note 100
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. See also HIGONNET, supra note 24.
134. Of course, this latter power was not explicitly granted in the Constitution of the United States, but
was determined to belong to the Supreme Court through the Court's own judicial decision. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (I 803) (concluding that the United States Supreme Court had the power
to declare a statute void that it considered repugnant to the Constitution, and legally establishing the
judiciary-and in particular, the Supreme Court-as an equal partner among the three branches of the
American federal government).
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do not have such power, and indeed are unlikely to even interpret themselves as having
the authority to possess a power of judicial review on a widespread basis. U.S. courts,
on the other hand, are in the business of making law, and in making law they have
been able to assert for themselves additional power to share control of the legal
agenda. 135 Of course, in the United States, Congress and the executive have the power
to draft and pass legislation. 136 But the power of the Supreme Court to at any time
declare legislation incompatible with the principles of the Constitution alters the legal
structure within society. As the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the appropriate
interpretation of the Constitution, so ultimately judicial decision remains the primary
source of law in the United States.
This system of separation of powers within the United States, and the corresponding roles granted to each political institution, have had a significant effect on the
manner in which the United States approaches international law. The Senate adviseand-consent procedure required by the U.S. Constitution prior to treaty ratification 137
has often made such ratification subject to the political whims of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Obtaining a two-thirds majority vote to consent to a treaty
frequently becomes the subject of a low-level political game in a way that is not
possible in France. This political maneuvering over incorporation ofinternational law
into the U.S. domestic legal framework is primarily a function of the historical
individualism and isolation the United States has adopted as a foreign policy stance;
interference with U.S. ideals by outside sources is generally not welcome. 138 In turn
this has contributed to a lower interest in international law and international relations
among the American public than their French counterparts, which accordingly puts
lesser impetus on the incorporation of international legal norms into the domestic legal
structure of the United States. 139
An additional institutional component of the United States that affects the
country's approach to international law is that of the U.S. federal system. Although
states on their own do not have the authority to enter into international treaties or bind
themselves or the United States to international agreements, the power of states to
make their own laws and structure their own judicial systems plays a role in how easily
international law can be incorporated into the domestic law of the United States. 140

135. LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGNAFFAIRSANDTHEU.S. CONSTITUTION
{2d ed. 1996). See also FALK.
supra note 25.
136. U.S. CONST.,art. I,§§ 7-8.
137. U.S. CONST.,art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the United States, the advice and consent procedure proceeds as
follows: Once a treaty has been signed by the President or his representative, the Senate, by a two-thirds
majority, must pass a resolution of"advice and consent." In this way, the Senate, which has no authority
during negotiation, can essentially freeze U.S. action on a treaty or dilute the treaty's terms through the
addition of reservations and understandings.
138. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 26-27.
139. Many of the more controversial treaties signed by the United States have "gathered dust for
decades" within the annals of the Senate. For example, it took four decades for the United States to ratify
the UN Convention on Genocide, and the United States and Somalia remain the only two countries in the
world that have failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted in 1989.
Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Gives Cold Shoulder to Treaties, L.A. TIMES, March 13, 2005, at A22.
140. For a discussion of the historical relationship between the states and international law, see HENKIN,
supra note 135.
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Not only do international laws have to pass muster among the members of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches at the federal level, they also must
overcome any objection at the state level. 141
Thus, on the one hand, it can be difficult to incorporate international legal
principles into the domestic legal foundations of the United States, due to a
combination of institutional structural resistance and indifferent public attitudes
towards international law. On the other hand, because of both the historical
"pioneering spirit" of the United States and the country's common law belief in the
adaptation oflaw to changing circumstances on a case-by-case basis, the United States
has traditionally been in the forefront of the development of new international legal
norms.
C. Sources of Law, Interpretation, and Change

The sources of law are also significantly different in the United States than they
are in France. This has had a profound effect on the incorporation and institutionalization of international legal principles into United States domestic law.
_
Although Congress is responsible for passing legislation that is considered the
law across the United States, the supreme law of the land in the United States remains
the Constitution. 142 Unlike France, where an entire section of the Constitution of 1958
is devoted to international treaties and their role as law in France, the U.S. Constitution
has but one clause relating to international law. 143 This treatment of treaties in the
Constitution, coupled with subsequent interpretation by the three branches of
government, has placed international law in a different position in the United States
than in France. Whereas in France, treaties are held in high regard as a source of
written law, the United States has a historical skepticism concerning the power of
treaties as a form of law. 144 Even though the Constitution declares treaties to be the
supreme law of the land, in practice, the United States government has taken a dualist
approach to international law, meaning that any international agreement that the United

141. An example of the influence states can have can be seen in the issue of the death penalty. In the
United States, primary responsibility for institution of the death penalty is left to the states. The United
States has not signed on to a number of international treaties that prohibit the death penalty, or has inserted
reservations as to treaty clauses on the death penalty, due in large part to political pressure by states that
wish to maintain the death penalty as a form of punishrnenL
142. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 32.
143. "Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST.,art. VI,§ 2.
144. See, e.g., THEFEDERALIST,
No. 15 at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
[T]hey were scarcely formed before they were broken, given an instructive but afflicting
lesson to mankind how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other
sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of
peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.
But see THEFEDERALIST
No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing in support of both
the proposed method of treaty ratification and on making treaties the supreme law of the land). This
disparity highlights one of the key differences between France and the United States. Whereas France has
long historical ties to the development of international law and international legal theorists, the United States
has taken very little part in the scholarly discussion that took place on the continent, and has very little legal
scholarship of its own to clarify the position of the founders on international law. See supra note 31.
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States does ratify is not automatically incorporated into the panoply of domestic laws
upon publication. 145 Rather, in the U.S., such instruments are generally held to be nonself-executing, and thus must be enacted into U.S. law through additional
Congressional legislation. 146
Moreover, in contrast to the French tradition, rarely in the history of United States
law have the writings oflegal scholars or general legal doctrine been used as a source
of law. 147 Nor have the moral precepts of religion been allowed to pervade (at least
overtly) U.S. courtrooms. Historically, United States law adheres to judicial decisionmaking as its primary source of law, followed by statutory law as a relatively distant
second. Because of this limited collection of sources of law, the law in the United
States is able to be more adaptable because new law is primarily formed out of judicial
decision. At the same time, however, the institutional structures of the U.S. legal
system make the incorporation of international law into the sources of law in the
United States extremely difficult (even where it is desired) and subject to political
games.
Because the sources of law in the United States are limited, and because
international treaties rarely make it out of the Senate (if they make it to the Senate at
all, and even if they do, they must be executed through additional legislation),
international law rarely becomes a part of the U.S. legal fabric and is not considered
an important source for use in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 148 Occasionally a justice
will point to foreign or international law in support of his or her position, but the
reference is invariably as a supporting reference, not as binding authority. 149
Furthermore, those on the U.S. Supreme Court who adhere to the "original intent"
mode of Constitutional interpretation are even less likely to find international law
persuasive. 150

145. See Kirgis, supra note 20.
146. Id.
Provisions in treaties and other international agreements are given effect as law in domestic
courts of the United States only if they are "self-executing" or if they have been implemented
by an act (such as an act of Congress) having the effect offederal law. Courts in this country
have been reluctant to find such provisions self-executing ....

Id.
147. DAVID& BRIERLEY,supra note 36.
148. See HENKIN,supra note 135; Eisemann and Kessedjian, supra note 82; Kirgis, supra note 20. See
also supra note 15 and accompanying text. But see Martin A. Rogoff, lnterpretation OJInternational
Agreements By Domestic Courts And The Politics Oflntemational Treaty Relations: Reflections On Some
Recent Decisions OJThe United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. INT'LL.&POL'Y 559 (1996). !tis true
that there have been times throughout U.S. history where the Supreme Court has been more active in
incorporating public international law into its judicial decisions. In the context of the body of U.S. case law,
these cases are few and far between, and throughout the 20th century the use of international legal principles
as legal grounds for judicial decision has become even more infrequent. For a contemporary discussion of
these views see A Conversation between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance Of Foreign Legal
Materials Jn U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia And Justice Stephen
Breyer, INT'L J. CONST.L. 519 (2005).
149. For a recent example of Supreme Court Justices referring to international norms, see Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
150. See supra note 145.
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On the other hand, because new law is made as situations happen-as cases come
before the courts-the United States has a history of pushing the envelope and making
new arguments where the law is concerned. Those skills are what U.S. jurists are
taught in law school, and that is how the advancement of law is carried out. If a new
argument works, then the new principles enter the realm of law as precedent. If the
argument works repeatedly across the nation, it often becomes codified in legislation.
This mirrors the approach of the United States where international law is concerned:
act first, then argue consequences later. While the French will take the very
generalized rules of international law and see them as binding rules, those in the
United States regard these international law concepts as having less the authority of
rules and more the character of general expressions towards which one should
work-lacking sufficient specificity for one to believe they are absolutely binding. 151

D. Public Perception of the Role of Law
Finally, we must consider the role the American public plays in the approach of
the United States to international law. When surveyed about the most pressing
concerns on which the United States needs to be focused, Americans consistently aver
that domestic concerns trump foreign policy issues. 152 Only during war-time, including
recently, post-9/11, have foreign policy issues surfaced as important areas of concern
for the American public. 153 Predictably, these concerns relate not to international law
and the legality ofU .S. actions but instead to terrorist threats and U.S. soldiers fighting
a war. 154 In contrast, where compliance with international treaties or other obligations
is concerned, the U.S. public plays a very small role, and puts very little pressure on
the Senate or the executive to ensure ratification. This is not due solely to the
institutional structure of the treaty ratification process; it is also due to the lack of
interest by the American population at large in issues of international law. 155

151. See DAVID,supra note 5, at 79 (highlighting the example of articles 146, which states that "(t]here
is no marriage when there is no consent," and 180, which states that "[a] marriage contracted without the
free consent of both spouses, or, of one of them, can only be attacked by such parties themselves, or by the
one whose consent was not free," which are very general). According to David, "Frenchmen are not
shocked by the generality of these articles and find that they contain perfectly ordinary legal rules." Id. In
a common law system like the United States, however, these rules would be considered too vague, and the
only real rules would come with judicial decisions deciding the specific errors concerning whether the
"nationality, health, chastity, or criminal record of one of the spouses is, or is not, a grounds for the nullity
of the marriage." Id. To David, it is a serious problem that in the United States, judges have become
exceedingly reluctant to interpret rules of international law, and that in many cases, the legislative and
executive branches do not even give them the opportunity.
152. See generally THECHICAGOCOUNCILONFOREIGNRELATIONS,
GLOBALVIEWS2004: AMERICAN
PUBLICOPINIONANDFOREIGNPOLICY(2004), available at http://www.ccfr.org/globalviews2004/sub/pdf/
Global_ Views_2004_US.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. For a general discussion of the ambivalence Americans have historically shown towards issues of
foreign affairs, see P. Terrence Hoppman, French Perspectives on International Relations after the Cold
War, 38 MERSHONINT'L STUDIESREV. 69 (1994). Given the current general apathy towards the conduct
of foreign affairs, it should come as no surprise that the ability of the American people to either evaluate or
participate in this realm of politics has been a subject of inquiry since de Tocqueville's time. See DE
TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 11 ( observing that American society is too ill-informed and too fickle to make
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The roots of this ambivalence can be seen in the historical legal tradition of the
United States. Developing in relative isolation, under its own unique brand of the
common law tradition, the population of the United States as a whole has developed
a view of the law as a tool to assist individual citizens to solve their grievances and
problems. Law is not seen as a remedy for society's ills, nor is law seen as the moral
compass for societal good. Law and morality have long been kept separate in U.S.
jurisprudence. This paradigm, coupled with the protection of individual interests that
has remained the focus of U.S. legal development, helps to create a public not
particularly interested in the broader, societal themes that generally make up
international law. It is, therefore, not that the United States seeks to disregard the rules
ofinternational law, nor that the people of the United States do not care if their country
abides by these rules. Instead, the incorporation of an international rule into the
domestic law of the United States simply becomes a more difficult task, given both the
United States' historical relationship with international law and the institutional
structures present there. Moreover, given the way the development oflaw progresses
in the United States, pushing the boundaries of international law is perceived as
perfectly natural.
V. LEGAL TRADIDON AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ultimately, what does this examination of the legal traditions of France and the
United States tell us about the behavior of the two states in relation to international
law? Does this provide us with a basis for addressing the differences between the two
states that might facilitate agreement, or at least mutual understanding, in the future?
This essay has considered the effects legal traditions and the legal system that
developed out of them have on the ways in which the United States and France
approach international law. Law, by its very nature, is designed to provide guidance
for actions, whether they be the actions of individuals or states. While other
institutional components of domestic systems have been examined in relation to their
ability to affect compliance with international law, 156 most international relations
scholarship has shied away from an examination oflegal traditions, legal systems, or
legal institutions. 157 The role oflegal tradition and legal systems has been alluded to
in several recent pieces but never empirically studied in either international relations
or international law. 158 Given that the law often forms the third in the triumvirate of

reasonable judgments).
156. One example of such an explanation is regime type. A number of studies have been done examining
whether a state's regime type (i.e. democratic, partially-democratic, authoritarian, monarchical) determines
its treatment of international law. Results of these studies have generally suggested that democracies are
more likely to recognize international law than other forms of regime. However, this does not provide an
explanation for the different positions of France and the United States, as both are advanced, industrial
democracies with strong commitment to the rule oflaw. It is because of this discrepancy that the underlying
historical development and values concerning law ultimately may play the decisive role in determining a
THE
state's treatment of international law. ANDREWp. CORTELL& JAMESw. DAVIS,JR., UNDERSTANDING
DOMESTICIMPACTOF INTERNATIONAL
NORMS:A RESEARCHAGENDA(2000); Andrew Moravcsik, The
Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000);
Simmons, Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8, at 8-9.
157. See generally BOYLE,supra note 25.
158. See Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights
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domestic institutions-and, perhaps even more importantly, given that international
law is, after all, law, and law is dealt with through legal institutions-an examination
of the role of the law as a constraint on a state's decision-making process could
provide new explanations for state behavior.
France and the United States are similar in many ways, sharing common liberal
traditions, values, and beliefs, as well as maintaining a long-standing alliance. 159 This
makes it crucial to understand why the two countries have taken different approaches
to international law and have maintained differing beliefs on the authority of
international law as a guide for state action. Much of the social science research from
the past several decades suggests that the United States and France, as similarly
situated countries, should take the same approach to international law. 160 Both are
advanced Western capitalist democracies; they are traditional allies who have a longstanding respect for the rule oflaw. One might think that these similarities in values
and economic position would lead to them sharing an identical approach to the
international system, including international law. 161
The United States and France do not always take different positions on the
validity, existence, or importance ofinternational law, and both are generally adherents
to international law. 162 However, this essay reveals that there are historical differences
in the legal traditions of the two countries that influence the approaches taken by
France and the United States towards international law. The unique characteristics of
each state's legal history have created distinctive views on what international law
means, how easily it is incorporated into the domestic legal structure of the state, and
how it is to be interpreted and amended. These different views have, sometimes,
created a difference of opinion between France and the United States on the
appropriate course of action under international law. This difference of opinion is not
indicative of a rift between allies, nor is it an indication that one state is more lawabiding than the other. Each state simply has its own constitutive view of the role of
law in society that frames all decisions it takes in terms of action in the international
system. This, I suggest, is what we saw in the case of the U.S.-French debate leading
up to the recent intervention in Iraq.

Obligations, in INT'LLEGALSTUD.WORKINGPAPERSERIES(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Boalt Hall Sch. of
Law, 2002) [hereinafter Simmons, Why Commit?); Sonia Cardenas, Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects
of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior, 6 INT'LSTUDIESREV.213 (2004).
159. Indeed, since the American Revolution, when France came to the aid of the emerging United States
in their struggle against the British, France and the United States have had a strong relationship. France and
the United States "respect the values" of one another and "have the same sense of history." With republics
founded on the same liberal, Enlightenment values, France and the United States have, in the words of
President Chirac, "always stood together and have never failed to be there for one another. That's been the
case since Yorktown and it still holds true today." Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (Sept. 8, 2002), http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France.
160. See generally Simmons, Int'/ Agreements, supra note 8.
161. Cf William J. Dixon, Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict, 88 AM.POL.
Sci. REV.(1994) (predicting "that democratic states embroiled in disputes will be more likely than others
to achieve peaceful settlements"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States,
6 EUR.J. OFINT'LL. 503 (1995); Simmons, Int'/ Agreements, supra note 8.
162. See supra p. 20.
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As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, however, many other explanations
have been raised as to the differences of opinion between France and the United States,
some predicting dire outcomes as a result of this most recent split. Do any of these
theories provide a better explanation than the one offered here? For example, what
about the effect of the relative positions of power of France and the United States as
an explanation for their different positions? Proponents of power theory argue that
international law is simply an epiphenomena! manifestation of interests and is only
made effective through the balance ofpower. 163 Rather than viewing the legal tradition
of a state as a fundamental component of the values and identity of the state,
proponents of power politics point to the positions of states within the international
community. Under the power politics theory, the United States, as the world's sole
superpower, has the ability to disregard international law if it so desires, while France,
as a great power but not a superpower, does not have the luxury of ignoring
international norms, and still must be concerned with maintaining a coalition with
other "law-abiding" states to balance the power of the United States. 164
I would suggest that theories based on power relations among states are
incomplete. Power certainly plays a role in state behavior; in simply considering
international law an "epiphenomenon" ofinterests, however, power-based explanations
fail to explain why norms exist at all. 165 Furthermore, power theories are not able to
explain the consistency in the behavior of these states-particularly the United
States-towards international law throughout history. Power theory would argue that
the United States, as the world's sole superpower, has the ability to ignore international
law if it wants and change it if it wants. This, the argument goes, is why the United
States went ahead and intervened in Iraq, despite the lack ofU.N. approval. However,
an examination of U.S. history with regard to international norms points to the
opposite conclusion. The United States did not begin its shift to great power status
until the tum of the 19th century, and did not achieve great power status until World
War 11.166 In the preceding period, the United States was inferior to major European
powers such as England, France, and Spain, in terms of military, naval, and, in some
cases, economic power. Yet the United States, on several occasions during the period
from 1787 to 1898, engaged in actions that would belie its power position. 167 This

PoLmcs (1979); BOYLE,supra note 25, at 7 ("In
OFINrERNATIONAL
163. See Kenneth Waltz, THEORY
the realist view of international relations, international law and organizations totally lack any intrinsic
significance within the utilitarian calculus of international political decision making."). See also L.
LAW (2nd ed. 1912); J. G. Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?
Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL
Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'LORG.(1998).
(1984); Simmons, Int'/
OF COOPERATION
164. See generally ROBERTAxELROD,THE EVOLUTION
Agreements, supra note 8; Simmons, Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8.
POLmcs (1999); Martha
OFINTERNATIONAL
WENDT,SOCIALTHEORY
165. See generally ALEXANDER
Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism, 50 INT'LORG.
(1996).
166. BOYLE,supra note 25, at 56.
167. Examples of this behavior include the War of 1812, the enactment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823,
the Mexican-American War of 1846, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. In each of these cases, the
United States engaged in activity either directly or indirectly against a great power, in a way contrary to what
power theorists would predict, yet in each case the United States felt that it was behaving in accordance with
supra note 7, at 45-49, and BOYLE,supra note 25
the laws of nations. On these examples, see DUROSELLE,
at 23-24, 56.
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history indicates that compliance with international rules and action within the
international system is not merely a result of power, but is rather based on the state's
view of the appropriate course of behavior: the legal framework guides the decision,
and concerns regarding power are moderated by the state's legal tradition. 168
As for the arguments that the United States can act the way it wants to simply
because it is the most powerful country in the world, two responses are in order. First,
an historical look at the actions taken by the United States in relation to international
law indicates that U.S. treatment of international law has been consistent throughout
its history, whether from the perspective of adhering to and abiding by treaties or other
obligations, or in terms of pushing the boundaries to create new international norms.
Second, post-WWII, the United States has been the predominant power across the
globe; certainly, post-Cold War, the United States is the only country in the world with
enough military power to carry out operations around the world. If the explanation of
power theorists is true, then the United States would have no need whatsoever to
adhere to international norms at any time-yet the United States continues to engage
in the international legal process, sign on to treaties, actively participate in the
international community, and support existing interpretations ofinternational law most
of the time, just as France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Australia, and other advanced
democracies do. 169
Historical analysis indicates that differences between the United States and her
allies surface in those situations which call for a decision to be taken that might be on
the fringe of international law-something
which pushes the boundaries of
international law beyond their current limits. This was the case in Iraq in 2003. The
United States did not flout international law in Iraq, but rather viewed the new
circumstance evolving out of the situation as a call for a new interpretation of existing
law. Like France, the United States is a country founded on the rule of law; and

168. But see KAGAN,supra note I, in which the author suggests that the post-World War II rise in U.S.
power at the expense of Europe is the explanation for, for example, the United States's "reliance on force
as a tool of international relations." The historical evidence contradicts Kagan's assessment in two ways.
First, the United States has adhered, and continues to adhere, to international law most of the time. Second,
the United States has been and continues to be willing to challenge rules of international law when they are
deemed outmoded (or, in the alternative, to declare new principles when necessary). Because of the way
that law is perceived in the United States, and because of the form of institutions that have developed, the
United States treats international law not only as a rule to be obeyed, but also one that can be changed when
necessary. This has been the case when the United States was a brand-new country and when it was the
world's sole superpower.
169. To be sure, power theorists are correct when they note that "[s]trong powers naturally view the
world different[ly] than weaker powers." KAGAN,supra note I, at 27. However, it is not enough to simply
rely on power position as the explanation. Certainly the United States has more power than France, but at
the same time, most of the time the United States works together with France and other allies to formulate
the best possible diplomacy or best possible course of action under the law. Although it could do so if it
wanted to, the United States does not invade every country that disagrees with it, or undermine every
business that competes with its own. On the other hand, there are states in the world that have nowhere near
the power of the United States, yet engage in behavior in the international system that belies their lack of
power. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea, Iran, and various African states have all engaged in
policies or actions in the international arena that are more aggressive than perhaps their actual power can
support. One reason for this is that these states have a willingness to ignore the rules of international law,
rules that constrain states like the United States and France because of the beliefs in those two states that
law governs society.
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neither country is more law-abiding than the other. What I am suggesting is that,
because of the historical legal tradition of the United States, and the resulting meaning
the law has assumed, coupled with the institutional framework in place to deal with the
law, the United States is more willing to look at the possible reaches of a given tenet
of international law, and argue the distinctions in a new situation that call for a new
interpretation. This is the same technique that lawyers use in arguing cases before the
courts in the United States every day-in fact, it is the primary method by which new
law is made. This is not the way that law is made in France, but it is the way that law
is made in the United States. Each country approaches problems differently and may,
therefore, have different interpretations of what international law says, and what
actions are allowable thereunder.
Another explanation provided by scholars for the different approaches to
international law between France and United States centers on the issue ofinterests. 170
Interest theory would argue that a state's actions are determined by its assessment of
what is necessary to protect or promote its own interests. 171 This interests-based theory
claims that in the case of the intervention in 2003, the United States underwent a
rational-choice calculation of costs and benefits, and determined that it was in its
interests to intervene in Iraq, despite existing international norms that would have
constrained any other country. France, on the other hand, made a determination that
its interests would be better served by continuing with weapons inspections. 172 This
view is closely related to the above explanation which focused on power capabilities.
The United States, as a superpower, has the military and economic might to follow its
own interests, despite some opposition. France, it could be argued, does not.
As with power-based explanations, however, interest-based theories do not
provide a nuanced explanation of the behavior ofFrance and the United States towards
international law. In the case of Iraq, for example, as Jacques Chirac himself
indicated, 173 France and the United States had the same interests: ensuring there were
no weapons of mass destruction contrary to U.N. mandate, and that there were no
terrorist cells; and seeing the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Where France
and the U.S. differed was on the best means to protect their stated interests. The
United States, influenced by its own historical development, believed the best way to
protect its interests was an immediate attack; if this position required a shift in the
understanding of pre-existing international law, then so be it-new situations call for
new rules. France, on the other hand, felt the best way to protect its interests, as well
as those of the international community, was through further diplomatic maneuvering.
These sharp differences did not alter the fact that both countries ultimately wanted the
same outcome; an outcome that would indeed protect their tangible interests. What
these differences did highlight, however, was the length to which each state would go
to protect its interests. The United States was willing to risk flouting international law

170. See generally Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); Cardenas, supra note 158; Simmons,
Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8; Simmons, Why Commit?, supra note 158.
17I. See generally Krasner, supra note I 70; Cardenas, supra note 158; Simmons, Commitment &
Compliance, supra note 8; Simmons, Why Commit?, supra note 158.
172. See Interview with Jacques Chirac, French President, supra note 3.
173. Id.
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by charging ahead with military force. France was unwilling to engage in force, but
was willing to continue working towards a solution through the United Nations. What,
other than their differing legal histories, can fully account for these very different
approaches to achieving the same goals?
A third potential explanation offered for the differing positions of the United
States and France on international law over the past several decades is that the United
States and France see different roles for themselves in the international community,
and are acting consistently with these visions. Historically, France has been a
diplomatic leader, preferring negotiation and discussion through multilateral
diplomatic channels to engaging in more direct action. 174 This approach is consistent
with France's diplomatic history. For example, in the months leading up to the start
of World War II, France (and Britain) engaged in a policy of appeasement with Hitler,
resorting to almost continuous diplomatic maneuvers in hopes of averting another war.
Even after Hitler engaged in breaches of international law, France preferred to
continue diplomacy rather than act. 17s Another example can be seen more recently in
the case of the conflict that embroiled the region of the former Yugoslavia. Europe,
with France in the diplomatic lead as usual, could not agree on a tactic with regard to
the ongoing conflict in Bosnia and other areas of the former Yugoslavia. The United
States had to push intervention in the Balkan conflicts based on humanitarian and
security grounds, ultimately acting through NATO, even though many thought that it
would be more appropriate for the European Union to address the crisis. Once again
the French predilection towards diplomacy and discussion, rather than action, created
a divide between the United States and France. 176
The United States, on the other hand, possessing as it does a legal tradition based
on the freedoms associated with the founding of the country, views self-initiative and
action as valid responses to new situations. Reputation in the United States is built
through individual achievement. Even bending the rules is regarded with tolerance
if an individual is trying to "make something of himself." The legal system in turn
supports this by creating a system in which creative lawyering-distinguishing
the
differences, finding the unique circumstances in any given situation-can result in a
new rule favorable to one's client, even if such a law did not exist at the time of his
action. Acting first and arguing the consequences later is part of the American legal
tradition. France, on the contrary, does not share this tradition. The judicial system
is based on carefully constructed written codes, codes designed to cover all possible
scenarios that might arise for the express purpose that the general population
understand the rules and abide by them. This, in the French view, creates a society in

174. But here we are faced with a problem of principle, I would say a moral problem. Are we
going to wage war when there's perhaps a means of avoiding it? In line with her tradition,
France is saying: 'If there's a way to avoid it, it must be avoided.' And we shall do our
utmost to do so.
Interview with Jacques Chirac, French President, supra note 3.
175. KAGAN, supra note I, at 15.
176. General Wesley Clark complained that an "unambiguous and clear warning" could not be sent to
Milosevic because the European states, with France in the lead, would not act without a U.N. Security
Council mandate. Quoted in KAGAN, supra note I, at 48. Clark goes on to say that it "was always the
Americans who pushed for escalation to new, more sensitive targets ... and always some of the Allies who
expressed doubts and reservations." Id.
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which all are on an even playing field, everyone knows what the law does, and thus
everyone is protected. Changes in these rules may only come about with the
participation of the entire community, not through individual judicial decisions.
Naturally, there are exceptions to these general statements, as no legal system is
an absolute. Certainly the United States has statutory law designed to protect the
community good, and judges in France are deciding more and more cases in a manner
similar to the United States. The underlying beliefs about the role of law, however,
which have been formed through the historical development of the legal tradition, do
seem to reflect the recent behavior of the United States and France, and do explain
why there was such as difference of opinion. The U.S. action in pushing the
boundaries of the definition of anticipatory intervention, arguing that circumstances
have changed and therefore a new concept is needed--even if the international
community as a whole has not yet agreed on such a change-is perfectly in line with
the general attitudes Americans have about law. At the same time, the French view
that continued diplomacy and discussion was the appropriate course of action, in line
with existing international law, and that no drastic changes could have been made
without community agreement, is in line with historical French views of the law.
Thus, while the role-based position has some merit, it serves in fact to bolster this
essay's contention that legal tradition, developed out of historical circumstances,
provides a better explanation for U.S. and French differences. France, with its history
of involvement at the center of Europe, its experience as a colonial empire, and its
influences characterized by international tradition has a more ingrained recognition of
existing principles of international law, which make it reluctant to act without
thoughtful, multilateral deliberation. The United States' history of isolation, along
with its domestic legal tradition, which has never easily incorporated international
rules, leads the United States to feel less constrained by many existing international
rules-but the United States is willing, when required, to push the boundaries of the
rules that it does recognize.
The historical examination shows that the United States and France have
maintained their internal consistency in their individual treatment of international
norms over time. In the United States, for example, the country's legal and political
institutions have remained virtually identical since their inception in the late 18th
century. Moreover, since that time, the country's position on international law has
been consistent, despite the fact that both the United States' power position in the
international system and the United States' interests have changed substantially. 177
France, on the other hand, has experienced a number of changes to its political and
legal institutions since the late 18th century, in addition to seeing its power position
and interests change dramatically. At the same time, however, France has maintained
its underlying belief in the values that formed the core of the French Revolution in
1789 and its relationship to the ideals of the key legal thinkers of the Enlightenment.
France has also held its position as a leader of diplomacy in the international system. 178

177. See supra note I 68.
178. "Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of
inducements rather than sanctions, compromise rather than confrontation, the taking of small steps and
tempering ambitions for success .... " KAGAN,supra note I, at 58 (describing the tools France prefers to
use in its international actions-in this instance, referring to the creation of the European Union).
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Despite its shift from being a key power both in Europe and globally to being in the
shadow of the United States, France has maintained its position as a key instigator and
negotiator among states, adhering to international law and focusing on diplomacy as
a means to solve problems, and emphasizing gradual change and incremental legal
solutions.
While all of these alternative explanations may play a part in the two countries'
divergent positions on the intervention in Iraq and their approach to international law
generally, they do not provide a complete explanation of these positions. A more
comprehensive explanation comes from a deeper historical and cultural analysis. The
legal traditions of the two countries, combined with the development oflegal cultures
and institutional structures out of these traditions, have created two very different
perceptions of the role that law (whether domestic or international) is to play in
governing society, and have influenced the approach that each state has taken in
complying with existing international law. International law does not exist in a
vacuum, but is instead based on conceptions oflaw found in the legal traditions around
the world. Adherence to international law, therefore, depends on the foundation ofthe
legal tradition of the state, the historical role of law in society, and the institutional
structures that have developed to incorporate and interpret legal principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the case of Iraq, the point of disagreement, again, was not the ultimate goals,
which France and the United States agreed on, but on the means to achieve those goals.
International law has always held that a state is allowed to defend itself, with armed
force if necessary, against an aggressor. International law has also long held that a
state does not have to wait to be physically attacked if it has clear evidence that such
an attack is imminent. As international legal jurisprudence has developed, it has come
to be held that imminent is defined as "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation." 179 This position on anticipatory selfdefense remained the international legal principle up to the 2003 action in Iraq, at
which time its bases were questioned by the United States.
The U.S. position on international law has been greatly influenced by its history,
culture, and institutional structure, such that the United States has adopted a position
on international law that is almost the complete opposite of that of France. Throughout
its history, the people of the United States have shown an "extraordinary ambivalence"
towards international law. 1so The American version of common law is driven by an
entrepreneurial spirit and economic referents, where continental law is driven by social
and political considerations. 1s1 Feelings of exceptionalism have been driven by U.S.
history, beginning with the "City on a Hill" sermon by John Winthrop, founder of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. 1s2 This was followed by centuries of policy of pushing the

179. See supra note 4.
180. See Iritani, supra note 139.
181. See generally Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, An Entrepreneurial Conception of the Law: The American
Model Through Italian Eyes in COMPARING
LEGALCULTURES
(David Nelken ed. 1997).
182. William M. Wiecek, America in the Post-War Years: Transition and Transformation, 50 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1203-04 (2000). See also KAGAN,supra note I, at 86-87 ("The ambition to play a grand role on
the world stage is deeply rooted in the American character. Since independence and even before, Americans
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 374 2006

2006)

THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION

375

boundaries ofintemational law, which can be traced through the Monroe Doctrine, the
Roosevelt Corollary, the rebuff of the League of Nations, and, most recently, the
military intervention in Iraq. This is based on what James Opolot calls that American
tradition of lawlessness. 183 This is not to suggest that the United States does not ever
comply with existing international law, because it does, more often than not. Rather,
these instances are offered as examples of the willingness of the United States
throughout its history-whether it was in the position of a newly emerging state in the
international system or that of the world's only superpower-to push the envelope of
international law.
The United States argued, in support of its efforts to amass an international
coalition in support of military intervention in Iraq, that the international legal
principle governing anticipatory intervention had changed as a result of the changed
circumstances of the international community. With the creation and spread of
weapons of mass destruction, and increasing globalization facilitating communications,
travel, and trade in weapons, the position of the United States was that the concept of
imminent attack must also change. The United States made, in fact, a classic common
law argument, distinguishing the present case from previous cases to highlight why
existing law did not apply, and in fact should be changed. The United States' position
was that new terrorist threats and new weapons call for a new approach to stopping
them, in order to ensure international peace and security. Lack of cooperation and
secrecy was enough to validate military intervention to ensure one's safety. No longer
were the traditional criteria of imminence valid, because if a state waited to respond
until it knew for certain that it was about to be attacked, with modem weapons of mass
destruction and modem weapons delivery systems, it would already be too late.
Response time was reduced from weeks, to days, to hours. This created changed
circumstances and called for a new legal norm.
France, on the other hand, approached the problem differently. While supporting
the goals of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, stopping terrorism,
and encouraging the removal of Saddam Hussein, France preferred to follow the
guidelines provided by existing international law-a law that had been around for
centuries, and which was clear cut, already available for interpretation, and that had
stood the test of time. Changing the components of the doctrine of anticipatory
intervention might be possible, and indeed might be desirable, but these changes must
come through international discussion, study, and agreement, not through an ex ante
argument focused on distinctive circumstances. The approach of France echoed the
French perception of law, its role, and its application. Putting faith in the political
branches of government to come up with the best solution, the French government did

who disagreed on many things always shared a common belief in their nations' great destiny.").
183. JAMESS.E. OPOLOT, AN ANALYSISOF WORLD LEGALTRADITIONS1 (1980).
People in the United States do not have the respect for law that people have in other
countries . . . . The law-abiding tradition is not strong. On the contrary, America has a sort
of lawless tradition, at least a fairly strong sub-culture of lawlessness, which came with the
settlement of a new country and the pushing out to new frontiers. Many persons in the
United States oversubscribe to the philosophy of taking chances with laws and regulations
and getting by with infractions.
Id.
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not agree that a new doctrine ofinternational law could be created out of the blue, even
in response to a crisis like the terrorist attacks of September 2001.
Different legal traditions are not equally capable of absorbing international law
into the domestic legal system, even if the underlying social values are sympathetic to
the international law in question. 184 For example, in common law countries, "[s]ocial
change is thought to be introduced ... through the adaptation of precedent to new
circumstances, not by means of legislation [of which treaties are an example]." 185
Moreover, common law historically has been more concerned with the administration
of justice than with justice itself. 186 This seems to fit the case oflraq in 2003, where
the United States was seemingly so concerned with carrying out its plan of
intervention, that there was very little consideration of whether this was the just thing
to do, whereas the French discourse surrounding the same decision focused on
achieving the just end to the situation, using existing lawful means.
For the United States, law is there to protect the individual and his or her striving
for the "American Dream." Law can be used to push the envelope, to achieve the
results that conform with our current values. This is how law functions at the domestic
level, and this is how the United States treats international law as well. In France, on
the other hand, law is a safety net, a constant recognized to protect the best interests
of society as a whole. It is not a tool to be altered on a whim. This too is carried
forward to international law, where strict adherence to principles designed to better the
whole is considered a moral imperative.
Neither approach is necessarily wrong, nor better or worse than the other. And,
in fact, both have allowed the achievement of some periods of progress when it comes
to international law. After World War II, the United States pushed the creation of the
modem human rights system and the modem world order. This was new; this was
different; and this is not a system that would have likely developed out of the French
tradition. 187 At the same time, however, the approach of France to international law is
essential to ensure that states actually do accept and internalize international law. If
there is no consensus among states or stability and enforcement for accepted
principles, then international law will fail. Constant change undermines compliance
with the law, and international law, given the vast diversity of states to which it
applies, must maintain some consistency, and clear principles, in order to survive-to
transcend the differences among states and be effective. So, both are necessary. The
point of understanding how these historical differences affect the way a state
approaches international law, and the corresponding perceptions of populations toward
international law, is that such understanding will allow those who work to further the
role of international law in society to understand one another, work together, and
create a stronger international legal system.

184. GLENDONETAL., supra note 7, at 234.

185. Id.
186. DAVID& BRIERLEY,
supra note 36, at 33 I.
187. Indeed even the development of the E.U. has largely been due to its aspects of the common law
tradition, which allow the pushing forward of the law, rather than the more rigid bases of the civil law
tradition.
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